Michigan Law Review
Volume 67

Issue 4

1969

Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from Selective Service Boards:
Some Proposals for Reform
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Military, War,
and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from Selective Service Boards: Some Proposals
for Reform, 67 MICH. L. REV. 756 (1969).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/5

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

COMMENTS
Systematic Exclusion of Negroes from Selective Service
Boards: Some Proposals for Reform
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Operation of the Selective Service System
The concept of the local draft board is based on the theory that
selection of persons for compulsory military service can be accomplished most fairly by small groups of neighbors of those who are to
serve. 1 As the National Office of the Selective Service recently stated:
"Because of its comparatively long association with a registrant and
knowledge of what he has done, the local board is relatively well
qualified to evaluate his ability to perform,"2 A corollary to this basic
theory is that a more flexible selection process evincing greater sensitivity to the problems of individual registrants can be achieved by
granting local boards some discretion in determining whether particular registrants are entitled to permanent exemptions or temporary
deferments instead of being inducted immediately.3
Although the premises which must support this model of the
ideal system of military selection may have been valid years ago,4
their contemporary validity is dubious. Today, the idea of a personalized local draft board is generally an anachronism, except in a
diminishing number of very small rural communities. The contemporary local board typically functions in a large, impersonal urban
or suburban environment, and this all but precludes any personal
contact between the registrant and those who are empowered to
select him for service. 5 Moreover, the National Advisory Commission
on Selective Service (the Marshall Commission) has severely criticized the role which discretion plays in the administration of the
system:
The present Selective Service System is based on a rule of discre1. NATIONAL .ADVISORY COMMISSION ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: 'WHO
SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967) [hereinafter MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT);
DAVIS &: K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

J.

(1968).
2. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 20.
3. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 20.
4. The first statute establishing a system of civilian boards was passed in 1917. Act
of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
5. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 20.
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tion, applied locally by more than 4,()00 different group~ fqllowing
guidelines that are general in nature. Its lack of uniformity is a
consequence of a deliberate policy of decentralization, which is considered one of its strengths.
The Commission sees the overriding need to be precisely the
opposite: To achieve the greatest possible degree of equity demands
. . . a system based on impartial standards uniformly applied
throughout the nation. The Commission proposes, in short, to
introduce a new controlling concept into the Selective Service ,System: the rule of law, to replace the rule of discretion. 6

Yet, despite its impracticality and theoretical imperfections, the
local board remains the central fixture in the immense bureaucracy
responsible for conscripting young Americans. As a result, the operation of the Selective Service System (SSS) is plagued by inequities.7
In particular, the Negro American has been required to shoulder a
greater share of the burden of our national defense than his Caucasian counterpart. 8 Such a result is not surprising; any system which
gives small groups of local citizens a relatively free rein in determining which of their "neighbors" are eligible to be inducted into the
armed forces runs the risk of institutionalizing community prejudices along with community understanding. When certain minority
groups are excluded from such a "personalized" selection process,
the exercise of discretion can easily degenerate into the practice 9f
discrimination.
B. Clay v. United States
The problem of racial discrimination in the operation of the
Selective Service System confronted the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit recently in Clay v. United States. 9 Cassius Marcellus
6. Id. at 31.

7. The Marshall Commission found that the exercise of discretion by local boards
across the country has led to unjustifiable variability in the granting of deferments
and exemptions to registrants. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 26-28. See generally
1 Layton &: Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 56 GEO.
L.J. 315 (1967); Comment, Judicial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need
for Reform, 56 CAuF, L. R.Ev. 448 (1968); Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under
the Selective Service System, II4 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1014 (1966); Note, The Selective Service,
76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966). See also notes 69, 70 infra.
8. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 22-26; see notes 85-90 infra and accompanying text.
9. 1197 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968), a petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3036, (U.S.
July 16, 1968). Al; this Comment was in the final stages of preparation, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari and remanded Clay to the district court for determination
of whether the Government employed illegal electronic eavesdropping in securing the
conviction and of whether Clay has standing under the fourth amendment to object
to the use of the information so obtained. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1969, § 1, at 26,
col. 2. Although Clay is no longer "before the Court" (as indicated elsewhere in this
Comment), it could reach the court again for consideration of the systematic exclusion
issue; moreover, a number of other cases in the Court of Appeals present the issue.
s,e note 12 infra.
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Clay,10 the Negro defendant in a criminal prosecution for refusal to
submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States in
violation of the Selective Service Act,11 claimed that his fifth amendment right to due process of law had been violated by the effect of
"systematic exclusion" of Negroes from membership on his local and
state draft boards. 12 Clay was reclassified l-A13 by his Louisville,
10. Clay's name is now Muhammed Ali, but he has been prosecuted under the name
he bore when he first registered with the SSS.
11. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1964), as amended, (scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.
App., Supp. III, 1965-1967).
12. Similar contentions have been made in other cases recently decided. See, e.g.,
Haven v. United States, 37 U.S.L.W. 2285 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1968) (relief denied for
reasons similar to those enunciated in the Clay case); Sellers v. United States, No. 26,108
(5th Cir. 1968) (pending) (followed Clay case); cf. Du Vemay v. United States, 394 F.2d
979 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3209 (Dec. 10, 1968) (question of systematic exclusion of Negroes from draft boards raised but case resolved on grounds of
nonexhaustion of administrative remedies).
There are numerous other cases based on the systematic exclusion argument pending or recently decided. In the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, see, e.g., Sellers v.
McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (1968); Battiste v. United States, No. 25,675; Kemp v. United
States, No. 25,704; Simmons v. United States, No. 25,371; Nelloms v. United States, 399
F.2d 295 (1968). In the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see, e.g., United States v.
Brooks, No. 18,679. There are also cases pending in the Second and Ninth Circuits
involving the systematic exclusion argument. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circait at 8 n.4, Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (1968).
Prior to any decision in Sellers v. United States, supra, appellant Sellers filed an
application for bail pending the disposition of his appeal. Justice Black concluded that
Sellers was entitled to bail. One of the criteria for determining whether a defendant is
entitled to bail pending appeal is whether his appeal is frivolous or taken for delay.
On this point, Justice Black stated:
Applicant contends that members of his race have been systematically ••• excluded
from Selective Service boards in his State. I am unable to say that a challenge to
draft boards of this kind would be dismissed by this Court as frivolous, and •.• I
must assume that the appeal to the court below is not a frivolous one.
Sellers v. United States, 21 L. Ed. 2d 64, 67 (1968).
13. Selective Service Regulations provide for classification of registrants into eighteen
classes. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.2 (1968). The classifications in order of priority are 1-A,
registrant is available for military service; l-A-O, registrant is conscientious objector
available for noncombatant military service only; 1-0, registrant is conscientious objector available for civilian work; 1-S, registrant is high school or college student who
has received notice to report for induction but is deferred until the end of the academic
year; 1-Y, registrant is available for military service, but qualified for service only in
event of war or national emergency; 2-A, registrant is deferred because of civilian occu•
pation; 2-C, registrant is deferred because of agricultural occupation; 2-S, registrant is
deferred as active student; 1-D, registrant is exempt as member of reserve component
or student taking military training; 3-A, registrant is deferred as father or by reason
of extreme hardship for dependents; 4-B, registrant is a public official deferred by law;
4-C, registrant is an alien; 4-D, registrant is exempt as a minister of religion or a
divinity student; 4-F, registrant is not qualified for military service on physical, mental,
or moral grounds; 4-A, registrant is exempt as one who has completed service or as
sole surviving son of person killed in military service; 5-A, registrant is over the age of
liability for military service; 1-W, registrant is conscientious objector performing civilian
work; 1-C, registrant is exempt as member of the armed forces of the United States,
the Coast and Geodetic Survey, or the Public Health Service. Persons deferred in the
national interest in categories 2-A, 2-C, and 2-S are liable for service until age thirty-five.
Other persons are liable for service only until age 26. All deferments are made on an
individual basis [50 U.S.C. App. § 456(b) (Supp. III, 1965-1967)].
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Kentucky,14 draft board in February 1966.111 His appeals to the Texas
and Kentucky state appeal boards,16 based on his alleged "conscientious-objector" and "ministerial" status, were unsuccessful.17 None
of these boards had a Negro member despite the substantial number
of Negroes residing in both states.18 In February 1967, Clay's classification was appealed to the National Selective Service Appeal Board
(presidential board) 19 by the National Director of Selective Service,
who is empowered to institute such an appeal on behalf of a registrant when he deems it in the national interest or necessary to prevent injustice. 20 The presidential board voted unanimously to classify Clay l-A. 21 On April 28, 1967, Clay reported to the induction
center but refused to submit to induction.22 He was indicted, tried,
and convicted by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas for refusing to submit to induction.23 On appeal, the
14. Local Board No. 47.
15. 397 F.2d at 905. For a lengthy chronological account of the events in Clay's case,
see 397 F.2d at 905-08.
16. On March 28, 1966, Clay appealed his 1-A classification to the Kentucky Appeal
Board. On January IO, 1967, the Kentucky Appeal Board denied the requested 1-0
conscientious objector classification. On January 12, Local Board No. 47, Louisville,
Kentucky, reviewed Clay's complete Selective Service file and unanimously agreed that
he was not entitled to a 4-D ministerial exemption. On January 19, 1967, Local Board
No. 47 again classified Clay I-A.
Clay then appealed the I-A classification and requested that the appeal board for
the southern district of Texas, his then current domicile, hear his appeal. This request
was made pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 1626.ll{c) (1968) which provides: "the registrant •.•
may ••. file with the local board a written request that the appeal be submitted to
the appeal board having jurisdiction over the area in which is located the current place
of residence of the registrant."
17. The appeal board for the southern district of Texas classified Clay 1-A and
returned his file to Kentucky on February 20, 1967, after rejecting both his conscientious objector claim and his claim for ministerial exemption.
18, 397 F.2d at 909. See notes 47-51 infra and accompanying text.
19. This board is authorized by 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967)
which reads: "The President, upon appeal or upon his own motion, shall have power
to determine all claims or questions with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or
deferment from training and service under this title ••• and the detennination of the
President shall be final."
20. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.l (1968). Clay could not file such an appeal himself because
the regulations [32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1968)] require the dissent of at least one member
of the state appeal board from the classification as a prerequisite to a registrant's right
to appeal to the Presidential Appeal Board.
21. 397 F.2d at 906.
22. 397 F.2d at 906. Clay refused to submit to induction on the grounds of his
religious beliefs respecting the Nation of Islam religion.
23. United States v. Clay, No. Cr. 67-H-94 CTune 21, 1967). Clay was sentenced to the
maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and a fine of SI0,000 for knowingly and
willfully refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces of the United States in
violation of 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967):
Any member of the Selective Service System or any other person charged as herein
provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this title, .•. who
otherwise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces or any of
the requirements of this title, .•• shall, upon conviction in any district court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not
more tl1an five years or a fine of not more than Sl0,000 or by both sucll fine and
imprisonment .•.•
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Fifth Circuit held that the I-A status assigned to Clay was a valid
classification by the Selective Service System, and that his refusal to
submit to induction had therefore been a criminal violation of the
Selective Service Act. 24
The Fifth Circuit's decision on Clay's systematic exclusion contention was based essentially on three grounds. While the court did
"not justify the failure to include substantial numbers of Negroes
on such boards,"25 it concluded that such failure did not violate any
rights secured to Negro registrants and thus that it did not invalidate their induction orders.26 The court further stated that, even
assuming a right to classification by a draft board from which Negroes had not been systematically excluded, Clay's classification and
induction was de facto valid and binding.27 It analogized the action
of his Selective Service boards to the acts of malapportioned legislatures: such acts are valid despite their origin.28 Finally, the court
noted that "the Appeal Board considers matters of classification de
novo and its classification is one of the first instance, not a mere
affirmance or reversal of the Local Board," and concluded that "any
. . . prejudice on the local level is cured by a fair consideration on
appeal." 29 Thus, the fact that there was one Negro on the three-man
24. 397 F.2d at 905. The Court stated:
There has been no administrative process which Clay (Ali) has not sought within
the Selective Service System, its local and appeal boards, the Presidential Appeal
Board, and finally the federal courts, in an unsuccessful attempt to evade and
escape from military service of his country. Being entirely satisfied that he has
been fairly accorded due process of law, and without discrimination, we affirm
his conviction.
25. 397 F.2d at 911.
26. 397 F.2d at 911. It is noteworthy that the Fifth Circuit held that a registrant
has no right to a racially proportioned draft board. 397 F.2d at 911. Clay, however,
did not claim the right to proportional racial representation on his draft board. He
did claim the right to a draft board from which members of his race had not been
systematically excluded. Petitioners Brief for Certiorari at 8 n.4, Clay v. United States,
petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3036 (U.S. July 5, 1968). In cases dealing with
systematic exclusion of racial minorities from juries, the Supreme Court has drawn
the distinction between systematic exclusion and proportional representation. In
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) the Supreme Court stated:
to say that [finding systematic exclusion unconstitutional] revives the rejected con•
tention that the Fourteenth Amendment requires proportional representation of
all the component ethnic groups of the community on every jury ignores the facts.
The petitioner did not seek proportional representation•.•• His only claim is the
right to be indicted and tried by juries from which members of his class are not
systematically excluded-juries selected from among all qualified persons regard·
less of national origin or descent. To this much he is entitled by tlie Constitution.
See also Atkins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945); United States ex. rel. Seals v. Wiman,
304 F.2d 53, 66-67 (5th Cir. 1962). Thus the Fifth Circuit seems to have misconstrued
Clay's argnment by failing to distinguish between an objection to systematic exclusion
and a demand for proportionate racial representation.
27. 397 F.2d at 911. 923-24.
28. See Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964), a/fd, 379 U.S. 694 (1965)
(Virginia General Assembly directed to reapportion itself by 1966 but permitted to
continue to enact statutes after passage of reapportionment act but before actual
reapportionment).
29. 397 F.2d at 912-13, quoting DeRamer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712, 719 (8th
Cir. 1965).
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presidential appeal board which heard Clay's case was deemed to
cure any possible illegality arising from systematic exclusion of Negroes from the lower boards.30
If Clay had shown that there was actual bias31 against him in
the proceedings to determine his Selective Service status, he could
have invoked the rule that arbitrary or capricious treatment of a
registrant violates due process and renders any classification or order
concerning that registrant invalid. The draft cases expressing this
rule require the registrant to prove actual bias and resulting injury.32 But Clay did not allege that any of his local or state appeal
boards had acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or prejudicial manner
by exhibiting actual bias during the classification and induction process;33 rather, he asserted that bias could be implied because there
was systematic exclusion of Negroes from the draft boards which
considered his case.34 To evaluate such a contention by a reclassified
-Negro registrant requires a preliminary inquiry to determine whether
Negroes have in fact been systematically excluded from those boards
which considered his classification.
II. THE

FACTUAL BASIS FOR A CLAIM OF SYSTEMATIC EXCLU-

SION OF NEGROES FROM SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARDS

The concept of "systematic exclusion" has evolved primarily in
cases involving alleged racial discrimination in the selection of grand
and petit juries. Basically, the concept involves a presumption that
a great disparity between the percentages of Negroes in the general
population and on the jury venire furnishes sufficient evidence of
the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service.35 The exclu30. 397 F.2d at 913.
31. Cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 215-24 (1959) ("pen,onal prejudice').
32. See, e.g., Swaczyk v. United States, 156 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S
726 (1946).
33. 397 F.2d at 913. The court stated: "Nowhere in the record in this case or in
appellant's brief do we find any specific charge or evidence of discrimination against
appellant because he is a Negro."
34. 397 F.2d at 910, 913.
35. United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2.d 53, 67 (5th Cir. 1962). See also
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954):
Having established the existence of a class, petitioner was then charged with the
burden of proving discrimination. To do so he relied on the pattern of proof
established by Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934). In that case proof that
Negroes constituted a substantial segment of the population of the jurisdiction,
that some Negroes were qualified to serve as jurors, and that none had been called
for jury service over an extended pe1iod of time, was held to constitute prima facie
proof of the systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury service.
This holding, sometimes called the "rule of exclusion" or the "prima facie rule,"
has been applied in other cases. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361·62 (1939); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); Gillespie, The Constitution and the All-White Jury, 39 KY. L.J.
65, 77 (1950). When only a few Negroes appear on jury venires over a long period of
time, a finding of systematic exclusion is not precluded. Exclusion need not be total
or absolute in order to be systematic. The Fifth Circuit has used the terms "significant
discrepancy" in Davis v. Davis, 361 F.2d 770, 772 (5th Cir. 1966) and "very decided
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sion need not be deliberate or motivated by malice in order to be
deemed "systematic."36
There is no reason why a similar disparity in the context of the
Selective Service System should not give rise to the same conclusion
of systematic exclusion. Draft board members, like jurors, need satisfy
only minimal standards in order to qualify for service; 37 thus, no
requirements of greater than minimum competence can justify racial
disproportion on draft boards.38 As in the jury cases, when there are
variations" in Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 991 (1967) in describing the degree of racial disproportion necessary for a finding
of systematic exclusion. See also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,471 (1953); Scott v. Walker,
358 F.2d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53
(5th Cir. 1962) (31.7% of population non-Caucasian, less than 2% Negroes on jury
rolls); Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (population of county
was 82% Negro and the jury list was 35.7% Negro). But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 206 (1965), in which 26% of those eligible for jury service were Negroes and panels
had averaged 10% to 15% Negro over the previous years. The Court held: "[we do not]
consider the evidence in this case to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment."
36. See United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman, 304 F.2d 53, 65:
Many of the cases speak in terms of "purpose to disc1iminate" . . . "intentional
exclusion" and "purposeful systematic non-inclusion because of color" •••. Those
same cases, however, and others ... show that it is not necessary to go so far as to
establish ill-will, evil-motive, or absence of good faith, but that objective results
are largely to be relied upon in the ... test [for systematic exclusionl.
37. See 50 U.S.C. App.§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); 32 C.F.R. § 1604.22 (1968);
note 38 infra.
38. As in the case of jury selection, an application of the rule would not require
that racial exclusion in the composition of draft boards be the product of deliberate
prejudice on the part of the governor of the state when he recommends individuals to
the President for appointment. See note 36 supra and accompanying text. Choice of
jurors and, draft board members, entails discretion in the process of choosing from
among available citizens. Discussing the jury problem, Professor Kuhn states that
"many legitimate non-racial factors can produce racial disproportion [on juries]. The
'prima facie rule' simply requires the state to demonstrate that non-racial factors did
in fact produce the disproportion, once chance has been eliminated as the source of
disparity." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rl:v. 235, 256
(1968). (For a comprehensive account of cases in which statistical disparity was held to
make out a prima facie case of systematic exclusion which was not rebutted by the
state, see id. at 254, n.82.) Of course, the qualifications for jury service then become
significant. And, as the Supreme Court stated in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S.
217, 220 (1946):
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be
found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a
group or class matter. That fact lies at the heart of the jury system. To disregard
it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent
to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
A finding of exclusion may result from the failure of jury commissioners to include
Negroes on the venire on the grounds that they knew of no eligible Negroes. Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940). See Note, The
Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection, 74 YALE L.J. 919 (1965)
923 n.29.
Likewise, it would be difficult for governors to rebut the presumption of systematic
exclusion from draft boards if eligibility to serve on a board turned on the satisfaction
of relatively insignificant criteria. Competency is a criterion that is equally important
in the recommendation of persons for appointment to draft boards as it is in the
selection of jurors. However, standards of competency must be viewed in light of the
statutory provisions establishing the qualifications for draft board membership; these
are set forth in 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). This statute provides
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many Negroes in the community and relatively few, if any, serving
on the decision-making panel, the laws of chance preclude, for practical purposes, the possibility that the disparity is merely fortuitous. 39
In determining whether or not systematic exclusion of jurors is
prevalent in a particular area, the courts have perforce referred to
statistical data. 40 The available data concerning draft boards indicate
that the President shall appoint three or more members to each local board upon
recommendation of the governors of the states. Local board members may serve for a
maximum tenure of twenty-five years, but not after attaining the age of seventy-five.
Also, no citizen is to be denied membership on any board on account of sex. 32 C.F.R.
§ 1604.52(c) (1968) requires that:
The members of local boards shall be citizens of the United States who shall be
residents of a county in which their local board has jurisdiction and who shall also,
if at all practicable, be residents of the area in which their local board has jurisdiction. No member of a local board shall be a member of the armed forces or any
re,erve component thereof. Members of local boards shall be at least 30 years of age.
32 C.F.R. § 1604.22 (1968) requires that:
For each appeal board area an appeal board, normally of five members, shall be
appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Governor. The members
~hall be citizens of the United States •.. they shall be residents of the area in
which their board is appointed; and they shall be at least 30 years of age•... The
appeal board should be a composite board, representative of the activities of its
area, and as such should include one member from labor, one member from industry, one physician, one lawyer, and where applicable, one member from agriculture.
,vhen recommending potential draft board members, governors must exercise sound
judgment in assessing their competence. Nevertheless, in view of the minimal eligibility
~tandards e~tablished by the federal statute and regulations, it cannot reasonably be
advanced that no members of a substantial minority group are eligible or competent
to serve.
39. Cf. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954), in which the Court stated:
Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain class will
serve on a particular jury •••. But it ta.i,;es our credulity to say that mere chance
resulted in there being no members of this class among the over six thousand
jurors called in the past 25 years. The result bespeaks discrimination, whether or
not it was a conscious design on the part of any individual jury commissioner.
See also Smith v. Texas, 3ll U.S. 128, 131 (1940): where 20% of the population of the
County was Negro, but very few served on juries, the Court commented that "[c]hance
and accident alone could hardly have brought about the listing for grand jury service
of w few negroes from among the thousands who undoubtedly possessed the legal
qualifications for jury service." Of course, the fact that juries exist only for the duration
of a single trial may make the statistical analysis of systematic exclusion more certain
in jury cases than in the case of draft boards: statistical "aberrations" on a draft board
tend to last much longer.
40. The courts have not yet adopted a purely mathematical approach to the determination of whether or not there has been systematic exclusion in the selection of
jurors. Rather, they have preferred to use statistics to augment their "intuitive .•.
understanding of the laws of chance." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41
S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 255 (1968). However, statistical theory does supply a mathematical
means for determining the likelihood of chance being responsible for the absence of
Negroes on jury rolls. See Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory
to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. ~v. 338 (1966). In Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (1967), the Supreme Court stated that while statistical theory was
unnecessary to the disposition of the case, it was "interesting to note the 'probability'
involved" with respect to the disproportionate ratio of Negroes in the population to
Negroes on the jury venire. Either method-an intuitive approach augmented by
statistical data, or a purely statistical approach-would be as useful in determining
whether a lack of Negroes on draft boards is the result of chance or exclusion as it is
in jury discrimination cases.
The Fifth Circuit, which decided Clay, "has frequently relied on percentages in
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that underrepresentation of Negroes pervades the SSS. The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged this inequity in citing the 1967 Marshall Commission Report, which assimilated data from draft boards in every
section of the United States.41 The Marshall Commission concluded
that, nationwide, "members of the local boards are ... almost exclusively white: a 96.3 per cent response to a Commission questionnaire
in October 1966 indicates that only 1.3 per cent of the 16,632 local
members are Negro ...." 42 According to the Marshall Commission,
only in the District of Columbia43 and Delaware44 were substantial
numbers of Negroes appointed to local boards; in twenty-three states
there were no Negroes on any draft boards.45
jury e.-._clusion cases." United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 887
(5th Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (1967), cert. denied sub nom.
Board of Educ. of the City of Bessemer v. United States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has drawn the inference of racial exclusion in school desegregation cases when the ratio of Negroes actually attending school with Caucasian children
is manifestly disproportionate to the ratio of Negro children to Caucasian children in
the public schools. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
at 887. See also United States v. Ward, 349 F.2d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1965), in which the
court compared the number of Negroes registered with the number of Negroes eligible
to vote.
41. 397 F.2d at 909. The Marshall Commission undertook extensive studies of all
aspects of the SSS. Included in the studies were inquiries submitted to each of the more
than 4,000 local boards in the country, and to each of the ninety-seven state appeal
boards existing at the time. MARsHALL COMMISSION REPORT 69.
42. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 19. See also id. at 19, n.7: "Responses to a
December 1966 telegraphic inquiry by the Selective Service System show 261 Negro
members out of 17,123 local board members, or 1.5%."
There has been some recent progress in bringing Negroes into greater participation
in the Selective Service System. See Recent Decision, Challenge to the Selective Service
System-The Right to Minority Representation on Draft Boards, 57 GEO. L.J. 189, 190,
n.10 (1968): "As of Aug. 1968, there were 791 minority members out of 17,000. This
represents an increase of over 280% in a two year period." See notes 45 and 52 infra
and accompanying text.
The racially disproportionate character of board membership was evidenced in both
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 75, table 1.6,
"Ethnic status or race of local board members in metropolitan areas and nonmetro·
politan areas":
Metropolitan
Non metropolitan
Ethnicity or race
No.
%
No.
%
Negro
White or other

178
6,083

2.8
96.0

35
9,423

.4
97.3

43. The District of Columbia had 80 Negro draft board members or 36.2% of the
total board members. 53.9% of the population of the District of Columbia is Negro.
MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 80, table 1.8.
44. Delaware had 26 Negro draft board members or 19.2% of the total. 13.6% of
the population of Delaware is Negro. Id.
45. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT table 1.8, at 80-81. (By January 1969, the number
of states without Negro local board members was eleven. Unpublished table provided
by the SSS, on file with the Michigan Law Review.) Many states were characterized
as having gross discrepancies between the percentage of Negroes on draft boards and
in the general population: in Illinois 2.6% of board members were Negro; 10.3% of the
population was Negro. In Kentucky ,2% of board members were Negro; 7 .1 % of the
population was Negro. In Maryland, 2.7% of board members were Negro; 16.7% of
the population was Negro. In Michigan 2,0% of board members were Negro; 9.2% of
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A compilation of more recent figures indicates that, although the
national situation had improved somewhat by January 1, 1969, the
percentage of Negro members on Selective Service boards is still
low. 46 l\foreover, there are still many states where Negroes are seriously underrepresented on these boards. The figures, presented stateby-state, are on pages 766-67.
In Kentucky, one state in which Clay appealed his reclassification
through the SSS, only 0.2 per cent of 641 local board members were
Negro, although 7.1 per cent of the state's total population was
Negro.47 In Texas, the other state in which he appealed, only I.I per
cent of local board members were Negro, although 12.4 per cent of
the total population was Negro. 48 More specifically, while there were
no Negroes on either of the local boards which considered Clay's
classification, 49 Negroes account for 12.8 per cent of the population
of Jefferson County, site of Clay's local board in Kentucky, and for
19.81 per cent of the population of Harris County, site of his local
Texas board. 50 Similarly, there were no Negroes on either of the
state appeal boards which considered his case, although Negroes
comprise 7.1 per cent of the population of Kentucky and 12.4 per
cent of the population of Texas. 51
Taken as a whole, these statistics would certainly support a conclusion that Negroes have been systematically excluded from serving in the SSS. On the facts of the Clay case itself, the statistical
base for a finding of systematic exclusion is very strong.
the population was Negro. In Missouri -2% of board members were Negro; 9.0%
of the population was Negro. In New York City 3.3% of board members were Negro;
14% of the population was Negro. In North Carolina 1.4% of board members were
Negro; 24.5% of the population was Negro. In Ohio 3.5% of board members were
Negro; 8.1 % of the population was Negro. In Oklahoma .4% of board members
were Negro; 6,6% of the population was Negro. In Pennsylvania 1.5% of board members were Negro; 7.5% of the population was Negro. In South Carolina ,6% of board
members were Negro; 34.8% of the population was Negro. In Tennessee 3.0% of
board members were Negro; 16.5% of the population was Negro. In Texas I.I% of
board members were Negro; 12.4% of the population was Negro. In Virginia 2.2%
of board members were Negro; 20.6% of the population was Negro. In West Virginia
,5% of board members were Negro; 4.8% of the population was Negro.
While it appears that the underrepresentation is nationwide, the greatest disproportions in the ratio of Negro board members to Negroes in the population are in
the South.
46. As of January I, 1969, there were 972 Negro board members out of a total of
over 17,000, or approximately 5.7%. Telephone interview with Col. Dee Ingold, Asst.
Director of the Natl. Selective Serv. Sys., Feb. 14, 1969.
47. 397 F.2d at 909. Of course, the figures cited in the Fifth Circuit's opinion are
those of the Marshall Commission. Comparable figures supplied by the SSS, as of January I, 1969, are presented in the table accompanying note 52 supra.
48. 397 F.2d at 909.
49. 397 F.2d at 909.
50. 397 F .2d at 909.
51. See note 45 supra.
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Negro
No.of
Percentage Percentage
Local
of State
of Negro
Board
Members" Members Population
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Dist.of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana

Difference
Between
Population
and Board
Percentages

344
20
100
312
576
268
104
20

1.2
0
2.0
13.l
11.6
0.7
4.8
25.0

30.0
3.0
3.3
21.8
5.6
2.3
4.2
13.6

28.8
3.0
1.3
8.7
6.0
1.6
0.6
-11.4

64
336
656
52
180
868
620
416
336
544
356
68
264
512
528
524
360
560
224

57.8
10.7
3.2
0
0
7.3
3.4
1.4
2.7
2.4
12.9
0
12.5
2.3
11.9
1.3
0
5.0
0

53.9
17.8
28.5
0.8
0.2

- 3.9
7.1
25.3
0.8
0.2
3.0
2.4
0.5
1.5
4.7
19.0
0.3
4.2
0.1
2.7
- 0.6
42.0
4.0
0.2

10.3

5.8
0.9
4.2
7.1
31.9
0.3
16.7
2.2
9.2
0.7
42.0
9.0
0.2

Deviation
from
Neutrality
Asa
Percentage
of Possible
Deviationb
96
40
-108

40
89
29
41
66
60
25
-

14
100
22

A complete explanation of the statistics used in this table appears in note 52.
b Figures are included in this column only when the difference between the percentage of
Negroes in the general population and the percentage of Negoes on the state's local draft boards
(fourth column) exceeds 2% and the change in the number of Negro board members for the given
state would have to exceed four in order to appear racially neutral. For a more complete discussion
of this column, see note 52.
11

52. This table was prepared from sources which are not completely contemporaneous. The resulting errors, where they exist, are errors which tend to understate
evidence of systematic exclusion by overstating the percentages of Negroes on the
various draft boards.
The number of local board members in each of the states ("state" as used in this
footnote will refer to any of the political subdivisions at the left side of the table),
presented in the first column, is based upon (I) the number of local draft boards in
each state as of January 1969 (unpublished table supplied by the SSS, on file with the
Michigan Law Review) and (2) the assumption that local boards have four members
when averaged by state. Unfortunately, the SSS does not supply figures on the number
of local board members per state, but two facts make the number four a reasonable
average: (I) the statute requires at least three members [50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3)
(Supp. Ill, 1965-1967)]; and (2) the nationwide average, based on 1966 figures for the
total number of local board members (MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 19 n.7) and 1969
figures for the total number of local boards (unpublished table, supra), is approximately
4-1/5. Even though the number of local board members may have increased somewhat
since 1966 (which would make 4-1/5 too small a figure) the number four was chosen
to avoid possible overstatement of racial exclusion.
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TABLE (continued)

Negro
No.of
Percentage Percentage
Local
of State
of Negro
Board
Membersa Members Population
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
NewYork
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Virgin Islands
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
CanalZone
Guam

384
68
52
184
124
640
404
212
536
332
128
704
324

44
184
264
420
620
156
56
516
8
120
224
320
92

4
4

0
2.9
1.9
14.7
0.8
14.2
6.7
0
8.0
8.4
0.8
8.7
7.1
4.5
12.0
0
5.0
7.7
0.6
0
6.4
75.0
5.0
4.5
1.6
1.1
0
0

2.1
4.7
0.3
8.5
1.8
8.4
24.5
0.1
8.1
6.6
1.0
7.5

Difference
Between
Population
and Board
Percentages
2.1
1.8
1.6
6.2
1.0
- 5.8
17.8
0.1
0.1
1.8
0.2
- 1.2

Deviation
from
Neutrality
Asa
Percentage
of Possible
Deviationb
100

-

73

-144
73

C

2.1
34.8
0.2
16.5
12.4
0.5
0.1
20.6

-

2.4
22.8
0.2
11.5
4.7
- 0.1
0.1
14.2

66
70
38
69

C

1.7
4.8
1.9
0.7

3.3
0.3
0.3
0.4

C
C

c Ccruus data unavailable.

The percentage of Negro board members for each of the states, set out in the second
column, is based on the figures in the first column and statistics on the number of
Negro board members per state (unpublished table, supra).
Negro populations for each of the states, set out in the third column, are based on
the 1960 census. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF nm CENSUS, UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATION: 1960, vol. I, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, pt. I, United States Summary,
page 1-164 (1964). Changes in racial percentages since 1960 are assumed not to be
,tatistically significant.
The fourth column sets out the difference by state between present local board
c.omposition and racially neutral composition. It is assumed that racial neulrality
-the goal referred to in this Comment as impartial nomination of board memberswill, on the average, equalize the percentage of Negroes in state population and the
percentage of Negroes on the same state's local boards; thus, the figures in the fourth
column are calculated by taking the differences between corresponding figures in the
second and third columns.
The fifth column must be interpreted with care. It may be said to represent for
eac.h &tate the degree of deviation from racial neutrality measured as a percentage of the
greatest deviation possible in that state. For example, Mississippi, which has no Negro
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THE LEGAL .ARGUMENTS

The argument before the Fifth Circuit in Clay was based on the
well-recognized right to classification by an impartial Selective Service board. 53 Critical to any such argument is the conclusion that
the right to an "impartial" board is equivalent to the right to a
board untainted by the systematic exclusion of members of the
registrant's race. 54
local board members but approximately a 40% Negro population, can be said to be
practicing "100% exclusion" in the sense that it could go no further than it does in
excluding Negroes from its local boards. If instead Mississippi's local boards were 30%
Negro (still assuming a 40% statewide Negro population), Mississippi could be said to
have achieved 75% of the ideal of racial neutrality, and its deviation from that neu•
trality-25%-would be its figure in the fifth column. Mathematically, the figures (x)
in the final column represent the quotient of the figures (y) in the fourth column and
the corresponding figures (z) in the third column expressed as a percentage. The
formula expressing this relationship is x 100% x y Jz. Not all states were assigned
a percentage figure in the final column because the ratios expressed in that column
become less relevant as the numbers being compared become smaller. Somewhat
arbitrarily, it was decided to calculate a ratio for the fifth column only when the
difference between the percentage of Negroes in the state and the percentage of
Negroes serving on local boards exceeded 2%, and when the number of changes that
would have to be made to achieve racial neutrality would exceed 4 board members.
In states not meeting both of these criteria, deviations can reasonably be attributed
to chance. In Alaska, for example, the fifth column figure would have been 100%,
yet ''6 /IO of a Negro" would have taken it to 0%, Generally speaking, the numbers
in the fifth column are more relevant as the total number of local board members in
the state and the statewide percentage of Negroes in the population both increase.
Figures on the racial composition of each local board are not made available by
the SSS. In terms of systematic e.xclusion, however, statewide figures may be more
significant than local figures. If nominations were made locally for each local board,
one might argue that a significant statewide deviation from neutrality was merely the
result of an accumulation of insignificant local deviations; the same "accumulation"
argument cannot be made when there is no accumulation of nominations, but only one
source for them-the governor.
53. See, e.g., Swaczyk v. United States, 156 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
726 (1946).
54. Another issue raised by the existence of systematic exclusion is whether Negroes
in general have the right to be equally considered with Caucasians for appointment to
positions on local boards and state appeal boards. For discussion of the statutory
provisions relevant to this question, see notes 93-102 infra and accompanying text.
It seems clear that if governors were to exclude Negroes from their recommendations on the basis of racial or other arbitrary criteria, there would be a denial
of equal protection. (Note, however, that parties challenging this discriminatory treatment might have to rely on the general concept of equal protection outside of the
fourteenth amendment. See note 55 infra.) Such discriminatory selection would be
directed at Negroes as a class, and would emphasize racial distinctions in opposition
to the accepted policy that government should be officially indifferent to race. Sec
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler,
108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959); Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 341, 353 (1949): "The assertion of human equality is closely associated
with the denial that differences in color or creed, birth or status, are significant or
relevant to the way men should be treated."
The current attitude of the Supreme Court is reflected in Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399 (1964), which involved the practice of designating the race of candidates on
voting ballots. It was asserted that the essence of the constitutional infirmity is the
racial classification per se, regardless of any showing of injury or prejudice. It is this
concept of presumptive unconstitutionality that would bring any e.xclusion of Negroes
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A. The Constitutional Right to Classification by
a Selective Service Board Free of Systematic Exclusion 65
It is well established that if a civil or criminal case is tried before
from consideration as potential draft board members within the sphere of prohibited
governmental activity.
Of course, there are difficult standing problems which would attend any attempt to
assert the right to be considered equally for an appointive position on a Selective Service
board. See note 133 infra.
55. Clay contended that statistics compiled by the Marshall Commission (see note
45 supra) evidenced racial exclusion in the composition of draft boards, in violation of
the fifth amendment. He invoked the fifth amendment due process clause (rather than
the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection clauses) because the SSS
is a creature of the federal government. Cf. Totus v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 7, IO
(E.D. Wash. 1941) (local board members are officers of the United States appointed by
the President). Hence, the acts of local and state appeal boards which he challenged
as being invalid invoked federal rather than state action.
There is, however, an element of state action in the process of appointing persons
to serve on draft boards, since the President is authorized to appoint members only
upon recommendation of the governors of the respective states. 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). Because the crux of the problem of systematic exclusion in the SSS is the unwillingness of state governors to recommend Negroes for appointment to these positions, Clay arguably could have invoked the fourteenth amendment to challenge the composition of his various draft boards. It is not clear whether
a governor is acting in the capacity of a state official, or whether he assumes the role
of a federal functionary administering the Universal Military Training and Service Act
when he makes recommendations to the President. The cases have universally held,
however, that since the appointments are made by the President, they are technically
federal. In United States v. Bordonaro, 253 F. 477 (W.D.N.Y. 1918) the court held that
"[t]he members of local boards appointed for carrying out the provisions of the Selective Service Draft Act are appointed by the President, and it is entirely immaterial
that the appointments are made upon recommendation of the Governors of the various
states ••• .''
,vhile Clay rested his systematic exclusion contentions on the due process clause,
the jury selection cases in which the concept of systematic exclusion has been developed
are most often based on the equal protection doctrine. But some mention due process
as well. See note 61 infra. Of course, if systematic exclusion can properly be said to
constitute a denial of due process in jury selection cases, there is no conceptual difficulty
in arguing that it should also amount to a denial of due process in draft board cases.
But even if systematic exclusion relates only to the equal protection clause (a proposition which is doubtful in light of the recent cases and commentary; see, e.g., note 61
infra) there is very little difficulty in applying that concept to the challenged "federal
selection" practices. Although the fifth amendment contains no express equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that the concept of equal protection is
part of the larger, all-embracing concept of due process. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) [applying Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) to public
schools in the District of Columbia)]; Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1945) ("[equal
protection] is a part of the public policy of the United States.') Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit announced recently that "the arbitrariness of a classification, if it is bad enough,
may be a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment even though that
contains no equal protection clause." Pacific Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 276 F.2d 350, 353
(9th Cir. 1960).
Hence, it seems clear that a registrant may rely on the fundamental gnarantees of
equal protection and may invoke the systematic exclusion rule even if state action is
not present in the factual circumstances surrounding his case. See generally Antieau,
Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 362, 363 (1952); Miller, An
Affirmative Thrust to Due Process of Law1, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 413 (1962);
Miller &: Scheflin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State:
d Preliminary Excursus (pt. 1), 1967 DUKE L.J. 273 (1967); Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 WASH. &: LEE L. REv. 182 (1955).
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a jury, due process requires that the jury be impartial. M It is also
settled that, with respect to juries, the term "impartial" means more
than "without actual bias." 157 When a defendant in a criminal prosecution demonstrates that members of his race have been systematically excluded from the jury venire, the court is often confronted with
a situation in which there is no proof that the exclusion actually
56. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). There arc numerous cases in which
criminal convictions have been reversed on the ground that the defendant did not
have a trial by a panel of impartial jurors. See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961)
(where a majority of jurors believed, on the basis of newspaper stories, that defendant
was guilty befpre the trial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (motion picture
showing defendant confessing to the sheriff had been televised and viewed by thousands
of persons including the jurors). It is clear that the right to an impartial jury is
guaranteed by due process as well as the express language of the sixth amendment,
which states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . ." (There is, of course, no comparable language respecting
the right to impartial Selective Service boards). It was not until 1968 that the Supreme
Court incorporated the sixth amendment into the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
391 U.S. at 149. Prior to the decision in Duncan, the jury trial provisions of the sixth
amendment were not deemed applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Hence, it was not necessary for states to provide for jury trials in all criminal
cases. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1947) (federal "cross-section rule"
does not apply to states); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (the right to
trial by jury is not of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"); Hallinger v.
Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 318 (1892) (state may allow waiver of a jury trial); cf. Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900). But it was
nonetheless required that if a jury was used, due process required that it be fairly and
impartially constituted. See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); cf. In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. !HO (1927); Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See also Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319,
346 (1957); Scott, The Supreme Court's Control over State and Federal Criminal Juries,
34 IowA L. REv. 577, 581 (1949); Note, Constitutional Law: State Jury Selection Procedure Held a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1967 DUKE L.J. 346 (1967).
57. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Supreme Court answered the question
whether the defendant was deprived of his right to due process by the televising and
broadcasting of his trial in the affirmative. Alluding to the possible effects television
might have had on the performance of the jurors, the Court stated:
It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we require
a showing of indentifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process ...•
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness
of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness • • • •
[T]o perform its high function in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance
of justice.' •.." ... "[T]he requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure
is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and greatest self·
sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would
offer a possible temptation to the average man ..• to forget the burden of proof
required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process
of law."
381 U.S. at 542-43 (emphasis in original).
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prejudiced the defendant's position. 118 Nevertheless, if the defendant
is a member of the race or class excluded,119 the court will presume
bias and condemn the verdict without requiring a showing of actual
prejudice. 60 Underlying any application of this rule are two lines of
reasoning which converge to require the reversal on equal protection
and due process grounds.61 First, it is axiomatic that a man's decisions
58. See notes 65-66 infra and accompanying text.
59. The broader question is whether any defendant has a right to a jury free from
systematic exclusion whether or not he is of the same race or class as the excluded
jurors. The comparable question in the case of a draft board would be whether any
registrant, Caucasian, Negro, or other, has a right to a draft board from which Negroes
have not been systematically excluded.
In jury selection cases, the courts have usually applied the so-called "sameclass rule,'' and held that if the defendant is not a member of the excluded race or
class, the danger of prejudice is not great and the verdict will not be condemned unless
there is proof of actual prejudice. See Scott, The Supreme Court's Control over State
and Federal Criminal Juries, 34 IOWA L. R.Ev. 577, 584 (1949). [But in Thiel v. Southern
Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946), the Court, speaking of exclusion of daily-wage
earners, indicated that it was "unnecessary to determine . • • whether [petitioner]
was one of the excluded class.'1
Presumably, the same rationale would apply to systematic exclusion of Negroes
from Selective Service boards. Of course, the same-class rule presents no obstacle to
Clay's argument, since Clay is of the same minority racial group as the excluded
board members.
For an argument that the same-class rule is unduly restrictive and that Caucasian
defendants should have an equal opportunity to challenge convictions on the ground
of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury venire, see Comment, The Defendant's
Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process
and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920-22 (1965).
60. See, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1949); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967); Note, Constitutional Law: State Jury
Selection Procedures Held a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1967 DuKE L.J.
346, 351-52; Comment, supra note 59, at 920-22. This discussion raises some points
that are also relevant in the context of the SSS.
61. Traditionally, the cases have held that systematic exclusion violates the equal
protection clause on the ground that Negro defendants were not treated as favorably
as Caucasians. It was thus unnecessary to decide whether the exclusion also violated
the due process clause by denying the defendant a fair trial. See, e.g., Fay v. New York,
332 U.S. 261, 284 n.27 (1946). See generally Scott, supra note 59, at 585.
One of the reasons why the courts have generally not discussed the due process
aspects of systematic exclusion is that the jury selection cases have almost invariably
involved state selection practices. And, the few cases involving discrimination in the
selection of federal jurors have not been decided on constitutional grounds; the Supreme
Court has preferred to rely on its supervisory power over the federal courts as a basis
for condemning such exclusion, or, in recent years, on the federal jury selection statute.
Kuhn, supra note 40, at 237-38. See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th
Cir. 1966); Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 224 F.2d 414, 423 (3d Cir. 1955); United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 222 (2d Cir. 1950), affd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494
(1951); International Longshoremen&: Warehousemen's Union v. Ackerman, 82 F. Supp.
65, 121-22 (D. Hawaii 1949). Nevertheless, some commentators and courts have cited the
due process clause in this context; see, e.g., Kuhn, supra note 40, at 242 &: n.32. As
was noted in Comment, supra note 59, at 939:
with respect to jury selection, it seems clear that equal protection and due process
point to the same fundamental values and that it is particularly appropriate to
include equal protection among the limitations of the due process clause upon
the kinds of criminal procedures that will support a conviction.
The Fifth Circuit applied a clear due process rationale in Labat v. Bennett, 365
F.2d 698, 723 (1966):
[Systematic exclusion] goes to the fairness of the trial. The "very integrity of the

772

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:'756

reflect his own personal realm of experience. Therefore, he may be less
sympathetic toward those persons with whom he cannot easily identify. 62 Indeed, particular individuals may manifest affirmative biases
against persons who differ from them in some notable respect. Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized in
Labat v. Bennett, 63 prejudice against a defendant is likely to occur
whenever members of his race or class are systematically excluded
from the jury considering his case. 64 Second, because of the difficulty
of discovering and proving the existence of actual bias, 65 the Supreme
Court has concluded that the "degree of prejudice can never be
known" in any particular case. 66 Thus, it is because of the likelihood
that undetectable bias against Negro defendants will result from the
systematic exclusion of Negroes from jury panels that the same-class
rule is invoked to vindicate the rights of these defendants to equal
treatment before impartial tribunals. 67
fact finding process" depends upon impartial venires representative of the community as a whole. The undermining of the jury system's fact finding process, the
opportunity for unfairness, the risk that defendants who may be daily wage earners
will be prejudiced by exclusion of jurors in the same class are dangers which would
compel condemnation of the practice without the necessity of the courts finding
actual prejudice affecting the outcome of the case. In this situation, as in the
straight out exclusion of Negroes, "the degree of prejudice can never be known."
62. This psychological phenomenon is, of course, particularly noticeable in the
context of the feelings and attitudes of Caucasians toward Negroes in America. Physical,
cultural, and linguistic differences between the races have been ascribed as causes of
the deep-seated racial prejudice which pervades much of contemporary society. See
generally G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (2d ed. 1962); G. Au.PORT, THE NATURE
OF PREJUDICE (1958); Kuhn, supra note 40, at 241-51.
63. 365 F.2d 698 (1966). See note 61 supra.
64. 365 F.2d at 723; cf. Billingsly v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 15-16 (5th Cir. 1966). This
idea was perhaps first elucidated in Scott, supra note 59, at 584. Since that time, numerous studies have demonstrated the effects of racial prejudice on Negro defendants in
American courts. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 210-11 (1966):
Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DuKE L.J. 19, 23; Tucker, Racial Discrimination in
Jury Selection in 'Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 736, 742-44 (1966).
65. It would require a difficult, if not impossible, mustering of sociological and
psychological data in order to prove that systematic exclusion resulted in actual bias.
See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 300 (1947) (dissenting opinion). Not only would it
be unfeasible to attempt to prove bias through the use of statistics, but, as the Supreme
Court has indicated, statistics are not sufficient in such cases because of the many
variables which make every case different in terms of possible bias. 332 U.S. at 280-81.
66. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
300 (1947), four dissenting Justices (Black, Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge) stated that:
We can never measure accurately the prejudice that results from the exclusion of
certain types of qualified people from a jury panel. Such prejudice is so subtle,
so intangible, that it escapes the ordinary methods of proof. It may ••• erode the
jury system before it becomes evident.••• If the constitutional right to a jury
impartially drawn from a cross-section of the Community has been violated, we
should vindicate that right even though the effect of the violation has not yet put
in a tangible appearance.
67. For a discussion of the same-class rule, see note 59 supra. Since Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the holding
that systematic or intentional exclusion of Negroes from jury service contravenes the
fourteenth amendment. Indictments and verdicts returned by racially exclusive grand
and petit juries against Negroes have universally been overturned. See, e.g., Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Arnold v, North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v.
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A draft board shares with the jury the power to impose upon
individuals an involuntary deprivation of personal liberty, 68 but it
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Avery v. Georgia,
345 U.S. 559 (1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Hollins
v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Bush v. Kentucky,
107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
68. It has been asserted that "[t]he Selective Service is the only government institution outside the criminal courts with the power to condemn a man to possible death."
Note, The Selective Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966). While this language may be too
strong, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in Clay, "[i]t is undeniable ••• that conscription deprives an indi~idual of his liberty, and may even
take his life.'' 397 F.2d at 911. Judge Wright of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has described the draft as "one of [the nation's] gravest powers over
an individual ••••" Wright, l3ook Review, 78 YALE L.J. 338, 342 (1968). Conscription
may also deprive individuals of substantial property rights in the form of lost income.
Clay, with his earning potential in professional boxing, is a case in point.
The important question, of course, is whether the draft board itself has the power
to aflect a registrant's liberty, rather than merely the power to administer clearcut
rules and regulations which affect a registrant's liberty. If the draft board is a purely
ministerial functionary, allegations that it has not acted impartially are meaningless
since there would be no discretionary functions which could be influenced by board
members' prejudice or partiality.
It is clear, however, that draft boards do exercise a good deal of independent
discretionary power in regard to matters of classification. See, e.g., Talmanson v. United
States, 386 F.2d 811 (1st Cir. 1967) (delegation of discretionary power to local boards
held proper). In fact, the present structure of the SSS has as one of its principal
attributes a great deal of local board discretion. See notes 1 8: 2 supra and accompanying
text. The local board is charged with the duty of determining, subject to appeal,
whether a registrant is entitled to deferment or exemption in lieu of immediate induction. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). See also 32 C.F.R. § 1622.l(c)
(1968); Tyrrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1952) (in determining what classification a registrant should receive, the board must consider each registrant available for
induction until his eligibility for deferment is clearly established to the satisfaction of
the board); Prieto v. United States, 289 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1961); Pickens v. Cox, 282
F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1960); Swaczyk v. United States, 156 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 726 (1946). The Marshall Commission recognized the "wide latitude for critical
judgment" accorded to local boards and characterized the SSS generally as being governed by the "rule of discretion" rather than by the rule of law. MARSHALL COMMISSION
REPORT, 27, 31; text accompanying note 6 supra.
For examples of the ways in which local boards may exercise discretion, see Bradshaw v. United States, 242 F.2d 180 (10th Cir. 1957) (Congress has given the power to
make decisions concerning facts of a particular case to the SSS); Brown v. United States,
216 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1954) (when evidence of a change of status is presented, the
local board must weigh the evidence and classify the registrant in light thereof);
Dickinson v. United States, 203 F.2d 336 (9th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S.
389 (1953) (a local board engaged in classification of registrants has the same right to
evaluate testimony as a trial court); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955) (the
local board has the authority to evaluate the credibility of the registrant), See also
notes 81, 118-19 infra.
For general comment on the degree of local board discretion, see Ginger, Minimum
Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases (pt. 1), 19 HAST. L.J. 1313 (1968); Com•
ment, Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
(1966).
For a discussion of the possible curative aspects of appellate procedure witl}in the
SSS, see pt. IV.A. infra.
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denies many of the procedural safeguards present in a trial at law, 69
and its actual operations enjoy a de facto administrative anonymity
69. See, e.g., United States v. Mientke, 387 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1967) (registrant was
not entitled to safeguards appropriate to a criminal proceeding at a classification proceeding). In United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 248 (7th Cir. 1967), the court
warned: "[T]he procedural framework of the draft classification process and the
narrowly limited judicial review available to draft registrants make adherence to
procedural safeguards crucial to the maintenance of basic fairness." Although the requirement of fairness is reiterated throughout the selective service laws and regulations, [see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 45l(c) (1964), 455(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); 32 C.F.R.
§ 1622.l(b) (1968)], the SSS is excluded from the more pervasive procedural safeguards
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59 (Supp. III, 1965-1967),
by 50 U.S.C. App.§ 463(b) (1964), excepting the sole provision in section 552 of the APA.
Due process, of course, guarantees the registrant minimum standards of procedural
fairness. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397, 405 (1955). But criticism of
the serious procedural deficiencies in draft proceedings has been abundant. See, e.g.,
White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 652, 676-79 (1968). Ginger, Minimum Due Process Standards in Selective Service
Cases (pt. 1), 19 HAsT. L.J. 1313 (1968); Layton &: Fine, The Draft and Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies, 56 GEO. L.J. 315 (1967); Leonard &: Frantz, Judicial Review
of Selective Service Orders, 26 Guu.n PRACTITIONER 85 (1967); Comment, Judicial Review
of Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 448 (1968); Comment,
Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014
(1966); Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 2123 (1966); Note, The Selective Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966); Note,
New Draft Law: Its Failures and Future, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 292, 315-24 (1968).
The following are some examples of weaknesses which may be present in SSS procedures. Local boards meet in private. There is no procedure by which the public can
scrutinize the decisions or work of board members, and there is no annual evaluation
of the performance of local boards by officials at higher levels of government. Ginger,
supra, at 1324. Local boards handle between 28 and 55,000 registrants, depending upon
time and location. MARSHALL CoMMISSION REPORT at 17. It has been disclosed, for
example, that San Francisco draft boards averaged less than one minute of consideration per case in 1967. Ginger, supra, at 1324 n.69.
The registrant is not informed of the reasons why a claim for deferment was rejected. See, e.g., Ayers v. United States, 240 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 1016 (1957). The notice of the right to appeal does not include instructions concerning the manner in which the appeal may be taken, nor, in many cases, does it
offer the services of the legal advisor, although some boards have adopted this policy
since 1967. Ginger, supra, at 1325. There is no procedure for challenging board members for ignorance of the law or of religious philosophy, although such ignorance may
lead to an erroneous classification. Id. at 1325. Nor can the board members be challenged
for prejudice against the registrant because of race, religion, or general appearance,
or for a general predisposition against granting conscientious objector status or other
deferments. Id. at 1325. The registrant is specifically denied the right to counsel at
the personal appearance, 32 C.F.R. § 1624.l(b) (1968), although he may bring an advisor.
But he is not informed of this right. Id. at 1325. See also Nickerson v. United States,
391 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1968). The registrant has no right to present witnesses in his
own behalf; this privilege is granted or denied at the discretion of the local board.
32 C.F.R. § 1624.l(b) (1968); Ginger, supra, at 1326. See also United States v. Capson,
347 F.2d 959 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 911 (1965); United States v. Sturgis, 342
F.2d 328 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). The registrant cannot cross-examine
any witness or official who has spoken against him. Ginger, supra, at 1326. He must
rely upon his right to inspect his file to discover any evidence used against him.
Shattuck, Record Keeping Obligations of Local Boards, l S.S.L.R. 4015, 4016 (1968).
The local board is required to place all tangible evidence that it used to determine
the registrant's proper classification in his file. Niznik v. United States, 173 F.2d 328
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949); 32 C.F.R. § 1626.13 (1968); Shattuck, supra,
at 4024. On occasion, local boards have failed to hold a formal meeting to consider
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for its members in which bias, if present at all, may flourish. 70 Moreover, because the scope of judicial review of draft board proceedings
is the "narrowest known to law," board action is often effectively
insulated from judicial scrutiny.71 Given these unfavorable factors,
requested classifications and have not allowed all members to participate in the decision. See, e.g., United States v. 'Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968). The discussion
at the personal appearance is not recorded; no stenographer is provided, and the
registrant is not entitled to bring his own. The only transcript of the proceedings must
be made by the registrant himself, based on recall. Such a record may be placed in
his file, but the registrant is not told to submit such a report. Id. at 1327. The regis·
trant's personal appearance is not open to the public. Even the request that family
and friends be allowed to attend has been rejected. The registrant is never advised of
his rights prior to the proceeding, and he is not told that any information given may
be used against him. Id. at 1326. The personal appearance has no form or structure.
Since the registrant is not told why his requested classification was rejected, he cannot
know what he needs to prove in order to change the decision on appeal. The decision
of the local board may be based on matters outside of the record. Id. at 1327; see, e.g.,
Lehr v. United States, 139 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1943); Harris v. Ross, 146 F.2d 355 (5th
Cir. 1944); cf. United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Commanding Officer, 58 F. Supp. 933
(D. Neb. 1945). There are no standards of proof to be met. Ginger, supra, at 1327.
There is no requirement, such as APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. II, 1965-1966), that
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence support the agency's (local board's) opinion. Id. at 1327.
70. Local board mtmbers are insulated from public (see note 69 supra) and judicial
(see note 71 infra) scrntiny. Moreover, no records are kept of the board's proceedings
which could later be evaluated. (See note 69 supra).
Young people complain of the anonymous cl1aracter of local boards. See MARSHALL
COMMISSION REPORT 20. Of course, the anonymity problem can be overstated, particularly since local boards have recently been required to disclose the names of their
members. See Martin v. Neuscllel, No. 68·301 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1968), vacated and
remanded for procedural reasons, 396 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1968); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1606.62-.63
(1968). Yet it seems clear that local board members are neither fully accountable for
their actions, nor sufficiently exposed to the public eye.
71. United States v. Blalock, 347 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1957). The basic rule is that
judicial review of a selective service classification or order is available only after the
aggrieved registrant has exhausted his administnttive remedies and has either taken
or refmed the final step toward military induction. See, e.g., Falbo v. United States,
320 U.S. 549 (1944); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); Muhammed Ali v.
Connally, 266 F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Tex. 1967). The registrant may then seek judicial
review in one of two ways. If he refuses to submit to induction he may assert any
claim as a defense to his criminal prosecution. Estep v. United States, supra. If he
bUbmits, he may thereafter petition for a writ of habeas corpus and challenge any
bclective service action in the resultant proceedings; e.g., United States ex rel. Levy v.
Cam, 149 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1945); Note, Habeas Corpus and Judicial Review of Draft
Classifications, 28 IND. L.J. 244, 252·53 (1953). A court will not reverse a board's action
unless there is "no basis in fact" to support its decision. See, e.g., ,vitmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); Cox v.
United States, 332 U.S. 442 (1947); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
Traditionally, there has been no pre-induction judicial review permitted. See, e.g.,
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955). Walkins v. Rupert, 224 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965) (per curiam). However, in one case, Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817
(2d Cir. 1967) a reclassification was held to present a justiciable controversy prior to
induction when the local board's action had a chilling effect on registrants' first
amendment rights. Thereafter, Congress, in response to the Wolff case, included a
new provision in the Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp.
III, 1965-1967), which restricts judicial review of classifications "except as a defense
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the impartiality which due process requires of a draft board72 must
mean more than simple lack of actual bias.73 Draft registrants, like
defendants challenging jury convictions on the basis of systematic
exclusion, will find it extremely difficult to unearth evidence of
actual bias resulting from the discriminatory selection of board members.74 More important, the decisions of draft board members, like
to a criminal prosecution • • • after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for induction ..•."
Although the 1967 Act appears to limit judicial review solely to criminal defenses,
the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend to preclude
the possibility of habeas corpus proceedings. Moreover, it is not clear that Congress
could constitutionally provide for such a preclusion. See Comment, Judicial Review of
Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 448, 459 &: n.81 (1968).
In any case, this remedy is often more illusory than practicable; thus, it is not often
used by registrants seeking to contest classifications. Comment, supra, at 461 n.91.
As Justice Murphy said in his concurring opinion in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S.
at 130: "No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review has ever been framed."
As of 1966, there were only three cases where the court actually ordered the inductee
released from the Army as a result of a habeas corpus proceeding. Arbitman v. ·woodside, 258 F. 441 (4th Cir. 1919); Ex parte Cohen, 254 F. 711 (E.D. Va. 1918); Ex parte
Beck, 245 F. 967 (D. Mont. 1917). In most of the other cases, the courts concluded that
Selective Service findings were neither arbitrary nor capricious. Comment, Fairness and
Due Process Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014, 1015 n.10
(1966). See also Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 S. CAL. L. REv.
123, 134 (1955); Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle
Course, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 2123 (1966); Note, Judicial Review of Selective Service Board
Classifications by Habeas Corpus, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 827, 829 n.7.
The traditional restrictive policy toward judicial review has recently come under
heavy attack by commentators. Moreover, at least one federal district court has held
that § 460(b)(3) of the 1967 Selective Service Act is an unconstitutional violation of the
fifth amendment's due process clause because it places unreasonable conditions upon
the registrant's right to obtain judicial review of his classification. Petersen v. Clark,
285 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Cal. 1968). See, e.g., Case Comment, Selective Service Act of
1967-Civil Judicial Review of Local Board Decisions-Section 460(b)(J) Violates Fifth
Amendment Due Process Rights and Is Unconstitutional, 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 469
(1968). This may be the wave of the future. As yet, however, it remains the minority
view. After Petersen v. Clark, supra, was decided by the district court, the Supreme
Court held in two cases that, except in limited situations, the statutory restraints on
judicial review [50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967)] in the Selective Service Act are constitutional. In Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 87
U.S.L.W. 4053 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968), the Court interpreted section 460(b)(3) to deny preinduction judicial review in cases in which a local board has made classification
decisions from its discretionary evaluation of evidence pertaining to the registrant's
status. But the Court held that the statutory restraint on judicial review would be
unnecessarily harsh in cases in which the registrant clearly qualifies for an exemption
and the only question is whether or not the local board's action is clearly forbidden
by statute or regulation. See also Clark v. Gabriel, 37 U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Dec. 16, 1968).
72. See note 33 supra. See also United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Commanding
Officer, 58 F. Supp. 933, 945 (D. Neb. 1945) in which the court referred to a registrant's
"constitutional right to due process [in the Selective Service System] of which there
is no doubt"; cf. United States v. Peebles, 220 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Sage, 118 F. Supp. 33 (D.C. Neb. 1954); Parrot v. United States, 370 F.2d 388 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 908 (1967).
73. Cf. note 31 supra.
74. Cf. notes 65, 66 supra. This is especially true since there is no way for a regis•
trant to challenge board members for bias or prejudice, nor are board members required to justify their actions. See note 68 supra. Indeed, bias might not even be a

February 1969]

Comments

777

those of jurors, are necessarily influenced by their sociological and
psychological predispositions; 76 thus, when Negroes are systematically
excluded from draft boards, draft board decisions are almost certain
to be weighted against Negro registrants. 76
The bias affecting the deliberations of draft boards which are
not impartially constituted may be undetectable in the individual
case, but there is compelling evidence of its general existence. 77 The
fact that no Negroes have been appointed to most draft boards78
suggests that members of the Negro race have been implicitly or
explicitly relegated to a position of inferiority; 79 whether this is the
product of conscious or subconscious prejudice, it is not conducive
to fair and equal treatment of the races. Ultimately, any classification
decision80-including whether or not a registrant is granted conscientious-objector status81 or a ministerial exemption82-may turn
conscious phenomenon. In many cases, subconscious partiality could be more damaging
since fair-minded board members would not have the opportunity to compensate
rationally for their own recognized prejudices. Of course in some cases outright racial
bias would be a manifest personality characteristic; for example, the chairman of a
three-man Atlanta local board expressed his disappointment that Selective Service files
contain no mention of a registrant's civil rights activities. He stated: "This nigger
Julian Bond [now a Georgia state legislator], we missed him. I've always regretted
that." NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1967, at 42, 43; cf. Du Vernay v. United States, 394 F.2d 979
(5th Cir. 1968) cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3209 (Dec. 10, 1968) (appellant alleges that
local board chairman has organizational ties with the Ku Klux Klan.)
75. See notes 62, 64 supra. These predispositions may be allowed a freer rein on
the draft board than on the jury. See note 70 supra. A draft board determination is
often not even circumscribed by ascertainable standards (see note 68 supra) while the
jury at least gets relatively precise instructions from the trial judge.
76. The very fact of systematic exclusion reflects a degree of racial prejudice existing in a particular area. The rationale of the same-class rule should apply to draft
boards as well as to jury exclusion cases. See text accompanying notes 59-67 supra,
text accompanying notes 77-82 infra, note 59 supra.
77. The Marshall Commission stressed in its summary of conclusions that "[The
Negro's] position in the military manpower situation is in many ways disproportionate."
MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 9.
Former President Johnson stated in a press conference on March 9, 1967, when
asked about the Marshall Commission report: "Unquestionably, in the field of Selective
Service boards, and the draft machinery . • • there has been discrimination against
minority groups." Brief for Appellee at 10, Clay v. United States, 397 F.2d 901 (5th
Cir. 1968).
78. See notes 42-53 supra and accompanying text.
79. Cf. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 26. (Comments on the
feelings of inferiority generated among Negroes by exclusion from juries).
80. See note 13 supra.
81. In reclassifying a registrant, the local board is simply directed to "consider the
new information which it receives and, if [it] determines that such new information
justifies a change in the • • • classification, the local board shall reopen and classify
the registrant anew." 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(c) (1968). It may base its decision on evidence
or considerations outside the record and all other information "pertinent to the classification." 32 C.F.R. § 1622.I (1968). See note 69 supra. Where actual proof is possible, of
course, objective evidence is controlling, but in searching a registrant's conscience and
motives a local board may evaluate a registrant's credibility and even his demeanor;
these factors could easily be decisive. See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
381-82 (1955); White v, United States, 215 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
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on intangibles such as the sympathy which the registrant evokes
from the board. For example, many local boards might find difficulty
in considering Negro laymen capable of developing intense philosophical and religious commitments to nonviolence.
The Marshall Commission came to the general conclusion that
"the Negro's position in the total military manpower picture ... is
in several ways inequitable;''83 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit cited
the portion of the Commission's Report which says that "there is no
evidence that the variability of the Selective Service System leads to
any systematic biases against poor people, or Negroes, insofar as the
final proportion of men serving in the Armed Forces is a measure of
this." 84 It should be clear, however, that the final proportion of men
in the armed services is neither an accurate nor an appropriate measure of discrimination-or the lack of it-in the SSS. 85 A more important and revealing statistic is that a far greater number of Negro
than Caucasian registrants are rejected for mental, moral, or physical
U.S. 970. The board may properly indicate in the written record that the registrant's
veracity is subject to question. See, e.g., United States v. Alvies, 112 F. Supp. 618 (N.D.
Calif. 1953). Other subjective factors may be weighed by the local board, such as the
idea that claims for successive deferments on varying grounds may call the registrant's
sincerity into question. See, e.g., 'Witmer v. United States, supra; United States v.
Peebles, 220 F.2d 114 (7th Cir. 1955); Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329 (8th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928. Evaluating the registrant's claim for a conscientiousobjector exemption is of necessity a subjective endeavor involving philosophical and
theological inquiry. In Clay, for example, the board evaluated his claims for a
conscientious-objector exemption in light of his past pugilistic efforts, and the Justice
Department in its recommendations characterized his Nation of Islam religion as
"primarily political and racial." 397 F.2d at 919.
82. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 456(g) (1964), which provides that registrants "preparing
for the ministry under the direction of recognized churches or religious organizations,
who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time courses of instruction in recognized theological
or divinity schools . . . shall be exempt from training and service • . . .'' Local Bd.
Mem. No. 56 (S.S.L.R. Practice Manual at 2179) stipulates that
[i]t is the responsibility of the local board to determine whether or not a thcolog•
ical or divinity school is recognized as such within the provisions of section [456(g)]
of the Act and also whether or not the church or religious organization under the
direction of which the registrant is preparing for the ministry is similarly recognized.
83. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 22.
84. 397 F.2d at 910 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit appears to have taken this
quotation out of context. The complete statement of the Commission follows:
While none of the evidence •.. is conclusive in itself, taken together it indicates
that there is a substantial amount of variability in the way the System operates.
There is both variation among states, and variation among boards within a single
state .... There is no evidence that the variability of the Selective Service System
leads to any systematic biases against poor people, or Negroes insofar as the final
proportion of men serving in the Armed Forces is a measure of this.
Qualified Negroes do serve .•• in higher proportion on active duty than do
qualified whites, at least in part because they have much lower rates of direct
enlistment in the Reserves and National Guard.
MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 71.
85. The Marshall Commission itself recognized that the final-proportion test was
misleading insofar as it indicates that Negroes and Caucasians are treated equitably
in the Selective Service System. Throughout its Report, the Commission cited instances
in which inequality is notable. See notes 77, 83, 84 supra.
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reasons.so As a result, the ratio of Negroes to Caucasians in the
armed forces, other factors being equal, should not be the same as
that in the general population; but it should, simply on a statistical
basis, be smaller. 87 Of course, "other factors" may not be equal;ss
for example, re-enlistment rates are higher for Negroes than for
Caucasians.so One thing, however, is clear: the Fifth Circuit's reliance on "the final proportion of men serving in the Armed Forces"
as an indication of fairness in the Selective Service System is unrealistic. 00
There is further reason why systematic exclusion should be
prohibited in the context of draft boards. The federal government
must exemplify fairness and equality to those who are called upon to
act in its defense. There can be no respect for the SSS, or for the
dignity of military duty, 01 if the burdens of national service are
inequitably distributed on the basis of race. As the Fifth Circuit
noted, "[t]he Selective Service System must not only be fair, it must
likewise have the appearance of fairness. Negro draftees should be
selected for military service by a system which gives Negro citizens
a full participation in the selection process." 92
86, As the Marshall Commission pointed out:
Department of Defense estimates showed that of all those examined, almost 50
percent of nonwhite men •.• in 1964 had been found unfit for service as opposed
to almost 25 percent of the white male population of the same age group. • • •
The percentage of Negroes considered qualified for service was thus considerably
smaller than the similar percentage of whites.
l\lARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 22.
87. Thus, while the final proportion of Negroes to Caucasians in the Armed Forces
is the same as that in the general population, 30.2% of the qualified Negroes were
drafted, whereas only 18.8% of the qualified Caucasians were. MARSHALL COMMISSION
RrPORT 22,
88, It would, of course, be presumptuous to ascribe the inequities of the Selective
Service System solely to the bias or discrimination of draft boards. While enlistment
rates are about equal for qualified Caucasians and Negroes, the Marshall Commission
cited two factors as possible explanations for the disproportionate conscription of
qualified Negroes as opposed to qualified Caucasians: First, fewer Negroes get into
reserve programs or National Guard units; second, fewer Negroes get into officer
programs.
89, J. DAVIS 8: K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE
SYSTEM 17 (1968),
90. Of course, any suggestion that Negroes should contribute a fixed percentage of
all those inducted, or that Caucasians should not contribute more than a fixed percentage, is an affront to the fundamental proposition that in the eyes of the law people
are individuals, not members of races.
91. In Clay, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated, 397 F.2d at 911:
There is no stigma attached to wearing the military uniform of the United States,
to the contrary, it is a badge of the highest honor.•.• It is the same willingness
of Americans to sacrifice their lives in the military service of the country which has
made it possible to establish the United States as a free nation ..•.
92. 397 F.2d at 911. The Selective Service regulations provide that an employee
"~hall avoid any action ••• which might result in, or create the appearance of" giving
favored treatment to any person, or which might undermine public confidence in the
integrity of the Government. 32 C.F.R. § 1600.735-20 (1968), Judge Wright of the D.C.
Circuit has con1mented: "'When a nation exercises one of its gravest powers over an
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B. The Statutory Basis of the Right to Classification by a
Selective Service Board Free of Systematic Exclusion
The Universal Military Training and Service Act93 contains a
declaration of congressional policy stating that "in a free society, the
obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces ... should
be shared generally in accordance with a system of selection which is
fair and just ...." 94 Any selection process that manifests inequality
by systematically excluding Negroes from participation in its selective processes can hardly be called "fair and just.'' 95 Fairness and
justice require government to be "officially indifferent to race." 00
"Distinctions between people solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality ... .'' 97
The Universal Military Training and Service Act also provides
that "in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this
title [sections 451-471], there shall be no discrimination against any
person on account of race or color." 98 This language is, by its own
terms, applicable to section 460(b)(3), which provides for the creation of local and appellate draft boards and authorizes the appointment of board members. 99 There is no indication in the statute that
the words forbidding discrimination apply only to registrants; to the
contrary, only a strained construction could avoid the conclusion
that discrimination in the selection of board members is forbidden.
Thus, proof of systematic exclusion amounts to a prima fade violation of this clause of the conscription statute.100
individual, it is imperative that the procedural rules and substantive criteria which
govern be clear, fair, and just." Wright, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 338, 342 (1968).
93. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1964), as amended, (scattered provisions of 50 U.S.C.
App., Supp. III, 1965-1967).
94. 50 U.S.C. App. § 45l(c) (1964) (emphasis added); cf. notes 77, 82 supra.
95. Cf. Smith v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 313 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1963) (military
and Selective Service laws are to be liberally construed); United States v. Frank, 114 F.
Supp. 949 (D.C. Cal. 1953) (tendency of the courts is toward a liberal construction of
Act in favor of the inductee).
96. Cf. Korumatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Justice Jackson concurring); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 27 (1959);
Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 353
(1949).
97. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
98. 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a)(l) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
99. Cf. note 95 supra. In Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893, 895 n.2 (5th Cir, 1968)
(per curiam), Judge Tuttle, in a separate opinion, stated: "The statutory language which
I think prohibits the appointment of such racially limited boards is that which requires
that ••.. in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this title ••• there
shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color • • • .' "
[quoting 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967)].
100. Discrimination in the appointment of board members may violate the statutory
rights of prospective board members (as well as their constitutional rights, see note 54
supra). There is a problem, however, as to whether a registrant, such as Clay, should
have standing to assert such violations in his own behalf, See, e.g., note 133 infra.
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Finally, the Universal Military Training and Service Act stipulates that "[t]he selection of persons ... shall be made in an impartial
manner, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe . . . ." 101 It has already been suggested that a system which
incorporates systematic exclusion and thus involves the likelihood of
undetectable bias cannot, as a matter of law, act in an "impartial
manner." 102 The same prejudices which motivate the systematic
exclusion of Negroes from draft boards are inevitably reflected in
the actions of the boards ultimately created. Consequently, in Selective Service board jurisdictions where systematic exclusion is demonstrable, the selection of persons for training and service is not accomplished in an "impartial manner" as required by the statute.
Read in their entirety, the statutory provisions reflect significant
emphasis on the need for impartiality throughout the conscription
system. Impartiality was a goal of Congress, but achievement of that
objective is severely jeopardized by a selection process that includes
many operating units which have been staffed in a discriminatory
manner.
IV. THE INDIVIDUAL REGISTRANT'S STANDING To CHALLENGE
THE COMPOSITION OF HIS SELECTIVE SERVICE BOARDS
The existence of a right does not necessarily mean that it may be
asserted by every person; the concept of standing comes into play
to limit an individual's opportunity to assert a particular right.103
The limitations which the standing requirement imposes are neither
clearly defined nor inflexible; 104 as generally stated, the doctrine
requires that a person be "aggrieved" in some sense by the denial
of a right before he may assert that right on his own behalf or on
behalf of others. 105
In the cases involving systematic exclusion from jury venires, it
is not necessary for a defendant to show that he has actually been
aggrieved in order for him to have standing to object to the composition of the jury which heard his case. A defendant is presumed to
be an aggrieved party whenever there is proof that members of his
race have been systematically excluded from the venire. 106 Similarly,
101. 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a)(l) (Supp. Ill, 1965-1967) (emphasis added).
102. See pt. III.A. supra.
103. The classic exposition of the standing requirement and other self-imposed
limitations on judicial review is found in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Justice Brandeis, concurring). See generally Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of "Standing", 14 STAN. L. REv. 433 (1962); Sedler, Standing
To Assert Constitutional ]us Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962);
Tate & Holzer, The Supreme Court and Standing To Sue, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 141 (1959).
104. See discussion in te.xt accompanying notes 159-62 infra.
105. See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923); cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
106. See text accompanying notes 59-67 supra.
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assuming the existence of a right to classification by a Selective Service board from which members of one's race have not been systematically excluded, proof by a Negro registrant of systematic exclusion should, without more, entitle him to personal standingthat is, standing to challenge the legality of his own classification.
As has been suggested, a presumption that prejudice results from
systematic exclusion is as appropriate in the context of Selective
Service boards as it is in the context of juries. 107
Two questions about standing remain: (1) Does an appeal by a
registrant to a biracial SSS appeal board deprive him of standing to
challenge his own classification? (2) Does an individual registrant
have "third-party standing" to assert the rights of other registrants?

A. The Effect of Consideration by a Biracial
Appeal Board108 on Personal Standing
In very general terms, a party becomes an "aggrieved party"
when some action is taken which significantly affects him.100 If such
action is the denial of a right, the standing doctrine generally precludes a claim for relief if the denial is subsequently "cured."110
The Fifth Circuit applied this aspect of the standing doctrine in
Clay: it held that since Negroes were not systematically excluded
from the presidential board which ultimately gave de novo consideration to Clay's classification, any illegality that could have resulted
from the systematic exclusion of Negroes from other units of the
SSS was cured by that board's decision. 111 It is submitted, however,
107. See text accompanying notes 68-82 supra.
108. The term "appeal board" as used in this Comment will include both the
state and the presidential appeal boards.
109. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 418-19 (1959).
llO. If a party's aggrievement is cured, he is no longer "adversely affected in fact."
See K. DAVIS, supra note 109, at 398-99.
Ill. 397 F.2d at 913. The court did not identify the standing problem by name.
Along with other reasons for denying Clay relief, however, the court stated that "[aJny
error or invalidity in the selective service procedures up to and including the Presiden•
tial Appeal Board was cured by de novo consideration by that board which acted in
the place and stead of the President himself." 397 F.2d at 913 (emphasis added). With
all deference, it is submitted that the presidential board can hardly be deemed to cure
errors in its own proceedings, unless, of course, there is a subsequent hearing for the
purpose of doing so.
In the Clay case, there were no Negroes on any of the local boards or state appeal
boards whiclI considered Clay's classification. Hence, systematic exclusion extended
through the state appeal board level and was absent only at the presidential board
level. In other cases, however, it is entirely possible that systematic exclusion might
exist at the local board level but not at the state appeal board level. Because the state
appeal board proceeding, like that of the presidential board, is characterized as de
novo, the question whether classification by an impartially constituted state appeal
board should operate to deny a registrant standing to challenge systematic exclusion
present at the local level would be likely to arise. The cases generally agree that state
appeal board action also supersedes that of the local board and cures any prejudice
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that there is a particular kind of prejudice resulting from improperly
constituted local boards which cannot be cured by the proceedings of
impartially constituted appeal boards. Under present conditions, not
all men eligible for service are needed in the armed forces; some
are deferred or exempted. 112 Deferments and exemptions are not
matters of right; rather, they are matters of legislative grace. 113 But
the fact that no registrant has a right to be deferred or exempted
does not justify arbitrary or discriminatory allocation of deferred or
exempt status. Due process demands that privileges be granted as
equitably as rights. 114 With the wide discretion accorded draft
boards115 and the broad guidelines used to determine classifications, 116 it is quite possible for boards to discriminate against Negroes
which occurred at the local level. See, e.g., De Remer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712,
719 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Van Hook, 284 F.2d 489, 491 (7th Cir. 1960);
United States v. Chadorski, 240 F.2d 590, 593 (7th Cir. 1956).
112. All qualified individuals are obligated to serve when called, of course, but
under present circumstances, all are not required to serve. As the Marshall Commission stated:
The facts are these: some 2 million men will be reaching draft age each year ....
Nearly three-fourths of them will be qualified for service under current Department of Defense standards. Of that l 1/2 million, only 600,000 to l million-varying
with the circumstances-will be required to serve. And of these, between 100,000
and 300,000 may have to be inducted.
MARSHALL Co~l?,USSION REPORT 37.
113. Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686 (D.C.N.J. 1967), affirmed, 387 F.2d 150
(3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (D.C.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 326 F.2d 846, aff'd, 380 U.S. 163 (196-); Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784 (10th
Cir. 1960); United States v. Corliss, 173 F. Supp. 677 (D.C.N.Y. 1959), a[fd, 280 F.2d
808, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (19-).
114. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT 127-28 (1959). It may be proper to
attach some conditions on the grant of "privileges" that could not be similarly used to
limit "rights," since privileges may be removed at the discretion of the authority that
extends them. But the right-privilege dichotomy is diminishing in importance. See
French, Comment: Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234, 236-39
(1961); Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional Rights
in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 31-32 (1964); O'Niel, Symposium: Law of the
Poor: Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 443, 445 (1966). In no circumstances may-privileges be conditioned for some racial
groups while being distributed unrestricted to others. Distinctions between people
based on race are per se unconstitutional. Differences in color or birth are in no way
relevant to the way men should be treated. See Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 353 (1949).
115. See notes 68, 81 supra. This includes the state appeal boards. J. DAVIS &:
K. DOLBEARE, LITILE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 106.
116. There has not been an attempt to establish uniform rules defining explicitly
the criteria for classification of registrants by local and appeal boards. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R.
§§ 1622.1-.50 (1968). The Marshall Commission Report stated that a great deal of the
variability in the system may be due to the "lack of standardization in the guidance
the local boards receive.••• [B]ecause the System offers wide latitude for critical judgment by the boards themselves, [the guidance] does not always articulate a clearly
defined policy to the board."
In resisting efforts to impose uniform standards for classification on local boards,
SSS representatives have stated:
We do not believe that more detailed mandatory criteria for local board classification guidance is desirable or would be beneficial to the registrant or to the country.
At the present time local boards, subject to appeal, determine the classification of
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and other minority groups within the confines of various Selective
Service classifications.117 For example, student, occupational, and
hardship deferments,11 8 and ministerial and conscientious-objector
exemptions, 119 may be granted as liberally as the law allows to
the registrant based on all the facts in the case and then knowledge of the general
economic, employment and defense situation in the country. There can be no
uniformity, nor is it desirable since there are no two cases that are exactly the
same, whether they be students, employees, or family providers.
Hearings on the Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service
System Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. at 9986 (1966).
See notes 68, 81 supra; notes ll8, ll9 infra.
In effect, the local boards are supposed to engage in a balancing process. They
determine whether registrants should be inducted-at any given time, this determination turns on the number of men needed and the relative merits of individual claims
for deferments and exemptions.
117. This is not to suggest that local boards could not discriminate in a manner
which would be patently illegal but nevertheless uncorrected by de novo appeal. The
most obvious possibility would be for local boards to act in a neutral way toward
Negro registrants while extending illegal deferments and exemptions to Caucasians.
Since Caucasians would not be expected to challenge their fortune, and since the local
boards are not required to write opinions which would expose this lack of evenhandedness, such illegality would probably not be exposed in appeals by Negro registrants.
But even if Negroes were overtly discriminated against, many of them would never
appeal. Indigent Negroes, for example, are unlikely to retain counsel and be aware of
their rights vis-a-vis the SSS. Hence many Negro registrants, even those who were discriminated against, would merely resign themselves to their fate and submit to induction without recourse to appeal. See Ginger, supra note 69, at 1335-37.
There are, of course, limitless possibilities for outright dishonesty and malfeasance
by board members or clerks in terms of altering files or failing to submit complete
information to the appeal boards. Most board members are undoubtedly honest. But
the occasional dangerous bigot would be less capable of prejudicing innocent registrants
if local boards were constituted in a less exclusive manner than is presently the case.
See note 74.
ll8. Occupational (2-A, 2-C) and hardship (3-A) deferments are perhaps most
susceptible to abuse since there are no clear standards which establish criteria for
determining whether a registrant is entitled to either. As a result, board members tend
to base their decisions regarding these deferments on general newspaper reading,
personal assumptions or prejudices, or such factors as the physical appearance of the
registrant or his choice of wording in the letter of written request. See J. DAVIS &:
K. DOLBEARE, supra note 115, at 81.
In the case of hardship deferments, local boards are charged with the responsibility
of determining when induction would operate as an "extreme hardship" on dependents-at best a subjective task. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(b) (1968).
In the case of occupational deferments, local boards were formerly guided by a list
of essential activities distributed by the National Security Council. The list, however,
was not always followed, and many boards paid little attention to it. J. DAVIS &:
K. DOLBEARE, supra, at 8. The Marshall Commission found that "[a]bout half reclassified into [occupational deferments] were in neither a critical occupation nor an essential
industry as defined by the Department of Labor." MARSHALL CoMll!ISSION REPORT 27.
In February of 1968, partly as a result of the above problems, the National Security
Council repealed the list of essential activities. Local boards are now authorized to
grant occupational deferments on the basis of a showing of an "essential community
need." This highly subjective standard emphasizes "community need" as opposed to
the prior standard of "national interest." J. DAVIS &: K. DOLBEARE, supra, at 8. See 32
C.F.R. §§ 1622.20-.24 (1968). Thus, local attitudes and prejudices may enter directly
into these deliberations.
ll9. By their nature, conscientious-objector exemptions involve subjective determinations by board members concerning the philosophical and religious beliefs of the
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Caucasian registrants, while Negro registrants may be confronted
with stricter application of the regulations, receiving an exemption
only when the law explicitly requires it. 120 Since both the liberal
standards applied to Caucasians and the strict standards applied to
Negroes could be valid if considered individually rather than in the
context of all the other cases decided by the same board, review by
an appeal board of a single case could not be sufficient. The fact that
a local board's discrimination falls within its range of discretion does
not make the discrimination any more acceptable. It does make it
harder to detect, and therefore harder to correct even in a "de novo"
hearing.121
The curative effect of review by an appeal board is open to
serious question on another ground: the characterization of the
registrant. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(g), 466(g)(2) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); 32 C.F.R.
§§ 1622.11, 1622.14 (1968). The present standard exempts any person "who, by reason
of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form." 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); cf. United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (the requirement that conscientious objection to war be based on
belief in a Supreme Being whose power is superior to the acts of men struck down);
Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH. L. REv. 679,
713 (1969). The criteria for granting conscientious-objector exemptions are qualified
by the provision that "the term 'religious training and belief' does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."
50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). This qualification raises significant
conceptual problems of comparative theology in light of the spread of new religions
and creeds throughout the contemporary Negro community. See Dodge, supra, at 71215. In the principal case, for example, the Department of Justice concluded that Clay's
objections to war, "insofar as they are based on the teachings of the Nation of Islam
'rest on grounds which are primarily political and racial.'" 397 F.2d at 919. Ministerial
exemptions may be more capable of objective determination. But even in this area,
subjectivity may play an important role; cf. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 456(g), 466(g}(2) (Supp.
III, 1965-1967); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1968); Matyastik v. United States, 392 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1968) (there must be a regnlarity of religious activities, a ministerial vocation
rather than an avocation); Jones v. United States, 387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968); Wood v.
United States, 373 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 389 U.S. 20 (1967)
(registrant must bear the burden of establishing the claim).
120. Of course, where uncontroverted evidence places the registrant clearly within
the confines of a claimed exemption or deferment, the board is not free to deny the
claim on the basis of speculation or conjecture. See, e.g., Dickenson v. United States,
346 U.S. 389 (1953); United States v. Wilson, 215 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1954).
121. It might be argued that appeal boards themselves engage in a balancing process,
free from rigid or uniform criteria, which would tend to negate any discriminatory
action by local boards and substitute the judgment of an impartial tribunal on appeal.
Appeal boards do apparently function in relatively autonomous fashion, and they are
vested with a great deal of discretion. J. DAVIS 8:: K. DOLBEARE, supra note ll8, at 106.
But there is some doubt whether appeal board proceedings arc in fact de novo. See
notes 123-24 infra. Moreover, appeal boards have a different frame of reference than
the local board; they review cases only of registrants who challenge local board classifications. Hence the appeal board could not be apprised of the extent to which certain
local boards might be unusually liberal in their treatment of registrants of favored
races or groups. Impartially constituted appeal boards can be expected to adopt reasonably fair policies with respect to matters of classification. But this does not assure
that they will apply the same standards as the local boards apply to the most favored
registrants in the community.
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review as "de novo." 122 The appeal board at either the state or national level can spend only a limited amount of time on each case,123
and it bases its decision about classification on the registrant's SSS
file as submitted by the local board (the presidential board uses the
file submitted by both the local and state appeal boards). 124 As a
practical matter, therefore, a registrant appealing classification within valid guidelines to an appeal board would in all probability be
faced with a decision unresponsive to the important distinction between evenhanded treatment and technical compliance. In reality,
such a decision would amount to nothing more than a formal reissuance of the local board's initial classification.
Thus, the essential question is not whether the registrant's classification is justifiable in light of the often imprecise SSS regulations;
rather, it is whether the regulations have been applied in an evenhanded manner by the local boards. As suggested above, there is no
evidence that the appeal boards give extensive attention to such
considerations.125 If the regulations are not applied equally regardless of race, the disfavored registrant has been denied due process and
should have standing to challenge the inequity regardless of de novo
consideration by the appeal board. Therefore, the registrant in Clay's
position should be granted standing to challenge his draft board's
prejudice.
Yet, even assuming that any prejudice affecting the registrant's
Selective Service status is cured by an appeal, he might justifiably
122. See Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,
54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 2123, 2159 (1966), which concludes that review by a state appeal board
is not, in practical effect, de novo. Information concerning the action of the presidential
board is sparse. Presumably, however, many of the difficulties inherent in the state
appeal board procedures are also present at the level of the presidential board; the
authorizing regulations are similar for each body. Compare 32 C.F.R. § 1626.1-.61 (1968)
with 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1-.8 (1968). See also J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, supra note ll8,
at 106-07.
123. There is one state appeal board for each federal judicial district [32 C.F.R.
§ 1604.21 (1968)] and one presidential board which is composed of a single panel of
three members (J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, supra note ll8, at 106-07). Both the state
appeal boards and the presidential board meet only once or twice a month. Therefore,
individual cases can receive only a brief analysis. J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, supra, at
100-07.
124. The registrant is not entitled to appear before either the state appeal board
or the presidential board. The state appeal board has only the registrant's file, as
submitted by the local board, upon which to make its decision. The state appeal board
is directed to consider only the information received in the record from the local
board, and "general information concerning economic, industrial, and social conditions."
32 C.F.R. § 1626.24 (1968). Standards for review by the presidential board are not
specified in the SSS regulations, but the presidential board also bases its decision
primarily on the registrant's file. J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, supra note ll8, at 107.
The registrant, of course, can build his own record by adding information to his
file at any time, but the file will also contain the findings of all other boards.
125. Even if the appeal boards wished to undertake such an analysis, it is doubtful
that useful comparative data would be available to provide them with information
necessary effectively to evaluate a registrant's status in light of the relative treatment
accorded other registrants by the local or state appeal board.
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be permitted to challenge bias occuring at the lower levels. The
end result of the draft process need not be sustained because
curative processes have operated. A fair appeal cannot erase the
prejudice which preceded it. Due process assures more than freedom from harmful prejudice; it also protects values which are unrelated to the elimination of outcome-affecting injury in a single
case-values such as the integrity of governmental processes and the
dignity of individuals affected by those processes. The importance
of these values in the context of judicial proceedings may explain the
willingness of appellate courts to overturn criminal convictions of
Negro defendants who receive a fair trial by an impartial jury if the
defendants were indicted by grand juries from which members of
their race were intentionally, or "systematically," excluded. 126 This
has been the universal result in these cases, despite the obvious
objection that such a defendant could not claim that he was prejudiced by the composition of the grand jury since any prejudice
occuring at that stage of the proceeding was presumably cured by his
subsequent fair trial.127 Although the courts have not articulated a
clear rationale for applying the systematic exclusion doctrine to
grand jury cases, 128 it is apparent that they have not allowed the
absence of outcome-affecting injury to deter them from attacking
the constitutional infirmity.
Two lines of criminal procedure cases also lend general support to
the principle of granting relief despite lack of prejudice. In Mapp
v. Ohio120 and subsequent cases the Supreme Court has required that
illegally seized evidence be excluded from state trials even though
the evidence itself was reliable. Among the reasons for imposing the
exclusionary rule on state courts, the AI.app Court included "the
imperative of judicial integrity." 130 Quoting Justice Brandeis, it
stated:
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it in126. See, e.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana,
356 U.S. 58'1 (1958); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400
(19·12); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
127. The lack-of-prejudice argument was made by Justice Jackson in Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 302, 30! (1950) (dissenting opinion).
128. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 300 (1950) Gustice Jackson, dissenting):
This Court has never explained how discrimination in the selection of a grand
jury, illegal though it be, has prejudiced a defendant whom a jury trial, chosen
with no discrimination, has convicted. The reason • • . perhaps, is that, in the
earlier cases •.• the discrimination condemned was present in selecting both grand
and trial jury and ... the opinions made no differentiation ...• Only within the
last few years have convictions been set aside for discrimination in composition of
grand juries alone, and in these the question now under discussion was not
di<cus~cd.
129. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
130. 367 U.S. at 660.
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vites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. 131
In several confession cases the Court has guaranteed to every defendant the right not to be convicted by the use of a coerced confession,
regardless of its relevance to the case or its veracity. 132
The standing doctrine, useful though it may be to prevent
wholesale constitutional litigation, should not operate to deny a
registrant his right to evenhanded treatment by the Selective Service
System, nor should it operate to allow continued undermining of
the integrity of the System.

B. The Individual Registrant's Standing To Assert
the Rights of Others
If a court is reluctant to grant personal standing to a Negro
registrant to challenge his classification on grounds of systematic
exclusion, the registrant could argue that he is also representing
other registrants. Such a claim would require a demonstration that
systematic exclusion of Negroes from Selective Service boards also
violates the constitutional rights of other Negro registrants. 133
131. 367 U.S. at 659.
132. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1959) in which Chief
Justice Warren stated:
It is . . . established that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids "fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false." •.. Consequently, we have
rejected the argument that introduction of an involuntary confession is immaterial
where other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates the confession .••. As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be convicted, there are
considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence. Thus, in cases
involving involuntary confessions this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of
our society that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the
government ... wrings a confession out of an accused against his will .•••
. . • "The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions ..• also
turns on the deep rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals
themselves."
133. It may be that a Negro registrant could assert the rights of Negroes in general
to be considered equally with Caucasians for positions on local and appeal draft boards.
The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a)(l) (Supp. III, 1965-1967), prohibits
discrimination in the recommendation and appointment of persons to serve on local
boards. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text. There has been some discussion
of the standing of criminal defendants to assert the rights of unknown jurors who were
systematically excluded from the venire. See, e.g., Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitutional ]us Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 658 (1962); Comment, The
Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing,
Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 931-36 (1965). While the courts
have not dealt with this question, they have long recognized that Negroes have a valid
interest in being included on juries [see, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1879)], and it is clear that jury discrimination "denies equal protection to Negro
citizens who are otherwise qualified for jury duty, because it denies them equal opportunity to serve as jurors." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L.
R.Ev. 235, 247 (1968).
By the same token, discrimination against available Negroes in the recommendation
and appointment of persons to serve on local or appeal draft boards denies them equal
opportunity to serve as draft board members. But the argument for allowing a Negro
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On occasion, the Supreme Court has granted third-party, or jus
tertii, standing to a litigant seeking to assert the rights of other
parties who would have been adversely affected by the outcome of
the case. 134 It is difficult to predict in a given case whether a court
will entertain a constitutional challenge in behalf of third parties.
This is true in part because of the Supreme Court's failure to articulate clear guidelines with regard to jus tertii standing.185 But perhaps
more important, the propriety of granting third-party standing turns
upon the particular circumstances of each case.136
Despite this uncertainty, in many cases it is clear that the
presence of important third-party rights has been crucial to the
Supreme Court's ultimate decision to allow an individual litigant to
assert broad constitutional claims.137 It has been suggested that there
are four factors which the Supreme Court weighs when determining
whether granting jus tertii standing is appropriate in a given case.138
The first of these factors is a consideration of whether the litigant
would be a vigorous enough representative of the third-party interests
he seeks to assert. It is apparent that the criminal defendant who has
draft registrant to advance the equal protection rights of excluded board members
may be even more tenuous than the hitherto unrecognized argument which favors a
grant of standing to criminal defendants to vindicate the equal protection rights of
excluded jurors. Since the draft board positions are filled by discretionary appointment,
no individual has a "right" to board membership.
Despite the technical difficulties inherent in any attempt to frame a "right" to draft
board membership or a registrant's standing to assert that right, it seems clear that
important interests, which go to the essence of the doctrine of equality, are infringed
by the discriminatory exclusion of Negroes from draft boards. Moreover, there may be
no realistic way in which these interests can be protected except in a registrant's
criminal appeal. Cf. Sedler, supra, at 638; Comment, supra, at 932-33 (suggesting that
existing remedies by which excluded jurors could vindicate their rights to serve on
juries are insufficient). The fact that a reversal of a registrant's conviction for refusal
to submit to induction on systematic exclusion grounds would deter the continuation
of exclusionary policies in the Selective Service System may not be sufficient grounds
to permit an express grant of third-party standing to the registrant, but it should not
be ignored in a compilation of the advantages that would flow from a judicial vindication of a registrant's right to draft boards free from systematic exclusion.
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctors challenging state anticontraceptive statute had standing to raise constitutional rights of married people with
whom they had professional relationship); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(NAACP had standing to assert members' ;right to freedom of association in refusing
to produce membership lists); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (owners
of private school permitted to assert rights of potential pupils and their parents);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (Caucasian land vendor had standing to assert
the rights of unknown non-Caucasian vendees to equal protection in resisting enforcement of a restrictive covenant). But cf. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943) (doctor
denied standing to challenge a state statute outlawing contraceptive devices on the
ground that it imperiled the lives of his patients). See generally Sedler, supra note 133.
135. Sedler, supra note 133, at 600.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 641-45.
138. Id. at 626-28. None of these factors should be considered conclusive, but all
arc relevant and likely to be balanced by the Supreme Court when it decides whether
or not to permit jus tertii standing.
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refused to submit to induction is vitally interested in the outcome of
his case. To him, failure means imprisonment.139 Thus, it is probable
that he would be a vigorous advocate of his own rights and the rights
of others who are similarly situated.
The second factor is the nature of the constitutional right being
asserted. "[I]t takes no great imagination to realize that certain constitutional guarantees inspire a greater sensitivity on the part of the
Court than do others." 140 The elimination of racial discrimination
from all areas of government activity has been a constant theme of
Supreme Court decisions, particularly since Brown v. Board of Education.141 Moreover, the need for equitably constituted draft boards
and the right of Negro draft registrants to be classified by a system
that is free from bias is of special urgency in light of contemporary
social problems.142
The third factor is the relationship between the litigant and the
third parties whose rights he is asserting. Where both are of the
same class, there is a greater likelihood that third-party standing will
be granted. In a case based on claims of systematic exclusion of
members of a particular race, the members of that race form a
meaningful class for purposes of asserting third-party rights.
The fourth and perhaps crucial factor centers on the question of
whether the third party can effectively assert the claimed rights in a
single, independent action. This is usually a pragmatic question: if
assertion by one of the third parties is unlikely, the Court will be
more willing to grant jus tertii standing to the litigant. Under
present circumstances, it is unlikely that Negro registrants would
seek to vindicate their right to be classified by racially balanced draft
boards until they have been classified I-A,143 since any such challenge
might elicit reprisal from the racially exclusive boards being attacked.144 The Selective Service Act of 1967 makes explicit provision
139. Violations of 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1964) for failure to submit to induction
are punishable by a maximum sentence of $10,000 fine and five years imprisonment.
140. Sedler, supra note 133, at 627.
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
142. The problems generated by systematic exclusion of Negroes from draft boards
are neither abstract nor neutral in character. The existence of racial discrimination in
the SSS impugns the integrity of the entire executive branch. Such discrimination can
only aggravate existing racial tensions in America. Moreover, for various social reasons
Negroes are more vulnerable to discriminatory treatment than more advantaged groups:
they are less likely to be apprised of their procedural rights, less likely to obtain deferments or exemptions, and, for economic reasons, often less able to secure legal advice.
See Ginger, 1'.finimum Due Process Standards in Selective Service Cases, 19 HASTINGS
L. REv. 1335-37 (1968).
143. It is doubtful that such a challenge could be undertaken in any case. Courts
have generally rejected attempts to enjoin the operation of selective service boards.
See note 149 infra.
144. A few cases involving punitive reclassification of registrants by local boards
have reached the courts. A prime example is ·wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16,
372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), in which two University of Michigan students were reclassified for sitting in at a local draft board and allegedly obstructing its activities.
The court held that the local board exceeded its jurisdiction by reclassifying the
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for judicial review only in the form of defenses raised to a criminal
prosecution for violation of the Act,145 and it is understandable that
many registrants would be unwilling to assert their rights in such a
manner. Although it is unlikely that the absence of authorizing
language in the 1967 Act is intended to eliminate the traditional
alternative avenue of review-seeking a post-induction writ of
habeas corpus146-this approach is seldom used because of numerous
pragmatic difliculties. 147 As a practical matter, Congress has made it
very risky for registrants to attempt to challenge the constitutionality
of their draft boards; 148 even if a Negro were to undertake a challenge
on the grounds of systematic exclusion, he would be likely to encounter the same problems that have faced recent defendants like
Cassius Clay.149 The practical difficulties imposed on all potential
challengers of systematic exclusion argue strongly in favor of allowing the main issues to be settled in one case, rather than in many. 150
students l·A, but limited the scope of its grant of pre-induction judicial review to
cases in which first amendment rights are impaired.
Lt. General Hershey did not follow the W olfj mandate after the decision was
rendered; he wrote a letter to all local boards in which he told the boards that any
registrant who had violated the draft laws should be reclassified. N.Y. Times. Nov. 9,
1967, at 2, col. 4. Although he later tempered this statement, it was never completely
withdrawn. N.Y. Times, Dec. IO, 1967, at 5, col. 1. See Comment, Judicial Review of
Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 448, 457 n.64 (1968).
See also United States v. Eisdorfer, 1 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3115 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Griffiths,
Punitive Reclassifications of Registrants Who Turn in Their Draft Cards, l S.SL.R.
4001 (1968); cf. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 82 (5th Cir.
1959), in which the court stated:
As Judges of the Circuit comprising six states of the deep South, we think that it
is our duty to take judicial notice that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of
Negroes from juries.••• [T]he very prejudice which causes the dominant race to
exclude members of what it may assume to be members of an inferior race from
jury service operates with multiplied intensity against one who resists such exclusion. Conscientious southern lawyers often 1·eason that the prejudicial effects on
their client of raising the issue far outweigh any practical protection in the particu•
Jar case .••• Such courageous and unselfish lawyers as find it essential for their
clients' protection to fight against the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries
sometimes do so at the risk of personal sacrifice which may extend to loss of
practice and social ostracism.
145. But see the possible exception discussed in note 144 supra.
146. See note 71 supra.
147. Id. See Comment, supra note 144, at 460-61.
148. See Tomlinson, Book Review, 67 MICH. L. REv. 854, 860 (1969).
149. For example, Clay was rebuffed several times by various courts in his attempts
to seek injunctive relief against the action of his draft boards on the ground of syste·
matic exclusion. In each case, the ruling court decided that judicial review was
unavailable until a registrant either submitted or refused to submit to induction.
The courts also held that except in rare or unusual circumstances, it was not a proper
function of the judiciary to enjoin the operation of Selective Service boards. See, e.g.,
Muhammed Ali v. Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Ky.), afj'd, No. 17,787 (6th Cir.
March 28), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); Muhammed Ali v. Connally, 266
F. Supp. 345 (S.D. Texas 1967).
150. Taking a criminal appeal through several appellate proceedings and ulti•
mately to the Supreme Court is a very costly endeavor. Few registrants of any race
would have sufficient financial resources.

792

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:756

The inability of injured third parties to assert their rights effectively is compounded in the case of the Selective Service System by a
peculiar device which permits the SSS Director to "appeal" a
decision unfavorable to the registrant. 151 In most instances, the opportunity to have de novo consideration at the presidential board
level would be clearly advantageous. Yet, in some cases the effect may
be quite the opposite. If the "de novo" hearing is deemed to cure
the particular defendant's right to complain about the effects of
systematic exclusion in the staffing of state and local boards,152 the
courts will simply have to wait to consider that issue until a registrant
appears who has been denied presidential review, either because of
the limited work capacity of the presidential board, 153 or because of
that body's limited jurisdiction (a registrant must have at least one
favorable vote at the state appeal board level to obtain presidential
board review on his own initiative).154 Thus, the SSS Director has
the chance to seek presidential board review of those cases which he
thinks offer the greatest threat of litigation.155 Those who seek to
assert their rights get "curative" review, while the majority without
the resources or information necessary to pursue their rights never
receive any review. Such a tactic on the part of the Director could
not work in every case, 156 but it seems undesirable to let it work at
all-the rights involved are too important.
Besides the four factors postulated above as criteria relevant to
the grant or denial of jus tertii standing, it is important whether the
reversal of a refusal-to-submit conviction would effectively cure the
practice which the defendant is attacking on behalf of third par151. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1 (1968). The Director may initiate such appeal when he deems
it in the national interest or necessary to prevent injustice. Id.
152. It is the prevailing view in the courts that presidential board review cures
any prejudice which preceded it at lower levels in the SSS. See, e.g., Clay v. United
States, 397 F.2d 901, 912-13 (5th Cir. 1968).
153. The presidential appeal board is comprised of three members selected by the
President. Most of its work is done through the mail from briefs of facts and suggested classifications submitted by the national headquarters. The board meets about
once a month to discuss particular problems. See J. DAVIS&: K. DOLBEARE, L!TILE GROUPS
OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECrIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 106-07 (1968).
154. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1968).
155. In the Clay case, for example, the Director appealed Clay's classification to the
presidential board at a time (February 24, 1967) when Clay was instituting suits for
injunctive relief against his draft boards on the ground of systematic exclusion [Muham•
med Ali v. Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Ky. 1967)). Since the purpose of the SSS
is to make men available quickly and efficiently for military service, any potential
disruptions or interruptions, such as a court decision divesting racially exclusive boards
of jurisdiction over Negroes, would probably be viewed as a distinct threat to the
system by those responsible for its smooth operation. They might well be interested in
avoiding such interruption, and the tactic of presidential appeal might afford them
the opportunity to do so.
156. If a registrant remains silent about systematic exclusion until after refusing
to submit to induction, there would be no opportunity for the Director to invoke
curative presidential review in his behalf, at least not for the purpose of avoiding
possible judicial intervention.
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ties.1117 If reversal of his conviction would have no deterrent effect on
continuing systematic exclusion, a grant of third-party standing
would clearly be inappropriate. In such a case, however, military
manpower demands and the resulting pressure from the community
to maintain orderly induction of registrants should ensure that a
reversal would have a rapid, positive effect in eliminating the evils
of systematic exclusion.
C. The Registrant's Case for Standing: A Summary
Neither the individual registrant's personal standing to challenge
the composition of his Selective Service boards, nor his jus tertii
standing to assert the rights of other persons adversely affected by
systematic exclusion, is clearly dictated by traditional standing principles. Although the standing doctrine has been used by courts as a
means of implementing general policies of judicial restraint, 158 some
recent Supreme Court decisions advance the theory that standing is in
reality an "amorphous concept," without clearly defined limits.159
Courts may now be more willing to grant standing, especially where
arguments for granting both personal and third-party standing are
joined in the same action. Moreover, policy considerations often enter
into deliberations about the propriety of granting or denying standing, 160 and cases involving racial discrimination have recently received particularly attentive consideration by the courts.161 In general, recent decisions suggest that rigid standing requirements are
being rela.xed to permit challenges to the constitutionality of governmental action and consideration of pressing civil rights issues.162
V. THE APPROPRIATE RELIEF: A CHALLENGE TO THE SUPREME COURT
The conclusion that systematic exclusion of Negroes from Selective Service boards is wrong by legal standards, and that a criminal
defendant in a prosecution for refusal to submit to induction should
have standing to "assert" that wrong as a constitutional defense, is
not enough. There remain difficult problems of judicial technique
157. See Comment, supra note 126, at 934-35.
158. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936);
Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42-51, 58-64, 74-79 (1961.)
159. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968): "Standing is an aspect of
justiciability and, as such, the problem of standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability. Standing has been called 'one of the
most amorphous concepts in the entire domain of public law.' " See also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961); Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (1966).
160. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
161. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and its posterity.
162. Cf. Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. REV.
4!13 (1962); Sedler, supra note 133, at 660,

794

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:756

in handling delicate issues. The following discussion is devoted to
exploring techniques that might be brought to bear on a representative case-Clay v. United States-presently before the Supreme
Court.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to determine the scope
of the relief sought and the type of corrective action that would be
required. Some random racial imbalance is unavoidable whenever
groups comprised of limited numbers of persons are impartially
appointed from a racially heterogeneous community.103 Any such
imbalances are the product of chance, not systematic exclusion; these
random imbalances can be eliminated only by replacing genuinely
impartial appointment procedures with an appointive system which
would operate according to some predetermined plan of racial apportionment. But actual racial apportionment is neither feasible nor
desirable as an alternative to impartiality in this situation. It should
not be required that draft boards be racially proportioned or representative of every minority group within their respective jurisdictions. Given the racial and ethnic heterogeneity of American society,
satisfaction of such a requirement would be a practical impossibility.164 Moreover, "weighting" the composition of a local draft board
in accordance with community racial population percentages is contradictory to the policy of official indifference to race implicit in the
constitutional equality principle.165 Once again, the goal is impartial
appointment. If, after achieving this objective, random imbalances
occur-and they probably will-they must be tolerated. 166
At the other extreme, however, are the gross imbalances created
by systematic exclusion of certain racial groups from appointive positions in the SSS.167 To the extent that such imbalances exceed the
level of imbalance attributable to chance they are neither random
nor incurable; therefore, they cannot be tolerated. If racial imbalance
163. This, of course, assumes that all members of the community are equally qualified for the positions to be filled. Imbalances caused by the unavailability of eligible
persons from certain segments of the community are a different matter. However, it
should be noted that the "qualifications" for draft board membership arc not rigorous.
See note 38 supra.
164. The only way that racial balancing could be accomplished would be for each
draft board to have a sufficient number of members so that one member from the area's
smallest minority group would bear the same ratio to the total number of board members as the total number of persons of that minority group in the area bears to the
total population of the area. This would be permissible [the statute provides for local
boards of three or more members, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967)] but
it would generally require immense boards.
165. See notes 96, 97 supra.
166. Indeed, it may be impossible to cure such imbalances. See note 164 supra.
167. Of course, in cases in which the minority group is very small, there may be
no way short of proving actual discrimination to distinguish random imbalances from
those produced by systematic exclusion. But if the imbalances are infrequent or
insignificant enough to be attributable to factors other than discrimination, there
can be no real basis for presuming improper conduct. In such situations, proof of
actual bias should be required,
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in the composition of Selective Service boards is the product of
demonstrable systematic exclusion, corrective action must be taken
to eliminate that measure of the imbalance attributable solely to the
discriminatory appointment process.
Because the President and the governors of the states are responsible under the Universal Military Training and Service Act for
appointing and maintaining Selective Service boards (the President
makes SSS appointments from the persons recommended to him
by the governors),168 they must be charged with the task of eradicating systematic exclusion. 169

A. Alternatives to Judicial Relief
The Supreme Court might choose to ignore the systematic exclusion issue in Clay v. United States, even if it does find merit in
the contention that systematic exclusion offends both the constitutional and statutory rights of SSS registrants. The Court could achieve
this result by holding that SSS rulings cannot be overturned without
proof of actual prejudice to the registrant,17° and that Clay did not
prove such injury. One of the primary motivations for this type of
a response would undoubtedly be a belief that systematic exclusion
could be eliminated from the SSS by Congress or the executive
branch soon enough to obviate the need for judicial intervention.
Deference to Congress or the President to formulate a solution to
the problem of systematic exclusion, however, might result in no
solution at all. Congress recently ignored the problem in passing
the Selective Service Act of 1967,171 even after the Marshall Commission reported on the racial inequities in the SSS.172 The Executive
has demonstrated somewhat more concern: President Johnson was
apparently dedicated to the solution of the problem173 and there
is no reason to doubt that President Nixon is similarly inclined. 174
168. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
169. As will be discussed hereinafter, however, it may require some judicial urging
to generate remedial action.
170. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
171. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-71 (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
172. The report was released in February of 1967. MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT,
at III.
173. In a message to Congress on the SSS, President Johnson stated that he had
ordered the National Director to work with the governors of the respective states "to
assure that all local boards are truly representative of the communities they serve
and to submit periodic reports on the progress in this area." President's Message to
Congress, March 6, 1967, 3 "WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 385,
395 (1967).
174. President Nixon's general disaffection for the draft is evidenced by his recent
order to the Defense Department to prepare a "detailed plan" to replace the present
draft scheme with an all-volunteer military after the conflict in Vietnam has substantially subsided. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at I, col. 8. If such a plan is
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But, because the President can appoint new draft board members
only from those persons recommended by the governors of the
states,175 he must rely completely on his powers of persuasion with
the governors to eliminate systematic exclusion of Negroes from
Selective Service boards. Unless he can convince the governors to
include Negro appointees in their personnel recommendations, he
cannot appoint Negroes to draft boards.176 Yet the President's persuasive powers are not always effective in the field of civil rights, particularly in states where significant racial hostility still exists. 177
Even if the governors of such states were willing to recommend
Negroes for appointment, however, the fundamental objections engendered by systematic exclusion might not be eradicated. For
obvious political reasons,178 these governors might want to recommend Negroes for some local board positions; for example, it would
be to their advantage to do so in counties with a Negro majority or a
substantial Negro minority, or in counties that demonstrate the least
racial bias and are thus more willing to accept Negro appointees. 170
While this would be desirable in itself, it would not cut to the core
of the evils engendered by systematic exclusion since counties with
be the least likely to achieve racial balance in the short run.
The governors would be hesitant to antagonize the majority of
governors would be hesitant to antagonize the majority of their
Caucasian constituents in such counties by recommending Negroes
for board positions. Furthermore, racially biased incumbent board
members might be less likely to relinquish their seats before the
law required them to do so if they realized that they might be reimplemented, the problems relating to systematic exclusion in the SSS would, of
course, be eradicated.
175. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
176. The Assistant Director of the National Selective Service System, commenting
on the problems encountered by the National Office in attempting to include more
Negroes on local boards, stressed that the powers of the National Office were limited
to "exhorting" governors to recommend more Negroes. This may explain the disparity
between the number of Negroes employed by the National Office and the number
sitting on local and state appeal boards across the country. According to the Assistant Director, the personnel employed by the National Office are approximately
35% Negro; the percentages are significantly smaller on local and state appeal boards.
Telephone interview with Col. Dee Ingold, Assistant Director of the Natl. Selective
Serv. Sys., Feb. 14, 1969.
177. An obvious example is that of President Eisenhower's difficulties with Governor Faubus and the integration of Little Rocle schools.
178. Governors are of course affected by political considerations and can be e.x•
pected to respond to pressures from constituents, regardless of their personal attitudes.
Whether or not they bend to local pressures is dependent upon many variables. But
since local board members come in direct contact with young men in the community
and directly influence their lives, community prejudices are likely to generate vigorous
opposition to the inclusion of Negroes on some local boards.
179. In many instances, of course, the same counties that would be amenable to
the inclusion of Negroes on local boards would also have a plurality, or at least a
substantial number, of Negro inhabitants.
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placed by Negroes. Since a local board member has a nventy-five-year
maximum tenure of office, 180 natural turnover might be totally ineffective in creating vacancies. Thus, one likely prospect is that in
many states there would be increased integration on draft boards in
counties where racial discrimination is relatively less serious, while
those counties harboring some of the strongest racial prejudice
would see little or no change in local board composition.
There are two possible executive solutions to this dilemma.
Neither, however, appears to be totally satisfactory. First, the Universal :rviilitary Training and Service Act provides that local boards
are to be comprised of three or more members. 181 Thus, if governors
were to recommend some Negro appointees to the President, he
could enlarge the membership of local boards in areas of significant
Negro population by selecting Negro board members. Of course, this
tactic would operate in spite of adverse community sentiment or the
unwillingness of present members to give up their posts. However, it
is not logically consistent with the long-term goal, postulated above,
of impartial appointment. And, the major practical fl.aw in this approach is that it is still the governors who control the appointment
of extra Negro board members; they merely have to limit their
Negro recommendations to certain relatively "safe" counties. 182
The second possible solution entails working toward some semblance of racial balance at the state appeal board level. State appeal
hoards can be reconstituted more quickly than local boards because
of their limited number.183 Moreover, the inclusion of Negro members on state appeal boards would not entail the same political "risk"
to governors as the inclusion of Negroes on local boards, since it
would not intrude as directly on local prejudices. Since every registrant is entitled to one appeal to a state appeal board for every reclassification by a local board, 184 reconstituted state appeal boards
could arguably offer an adequate means of relief to Negro registrants aggrieved by systematic exclusion at the local board level. Yet,
the effectiveness of state appeal boards in curing the effects of local
board prejudice depends on their ability to give fair consideration
to each registrant's appeal. The fact that state appeal boards are
180. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
181. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
182. Recommendations do not go into a general statewide pool from which the
President fills vacancies by appointment. Separate recommendations must be made for
each draft board jurisdiction because the Selective Service Act, § 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967), requires that members of a local board reside in
the geographical area over which their board has jurisdiction.
183. There is one appeal board for each judicial district. 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52(a).
Correcting a few appeal boards in each state can be more easily accomplished, as a
practical matter, than correcting several hundred local boards in various communities
throughout each state.
18,t. 50 U.S.C. App.§ 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967); 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2 (1968).
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available to all registrants is insufficient in and of itself. The de novo
review which state appeal boards are supposed to provide has recently been criticized as not being de novo at all.185The main complaints seem to be that the state appeal boards have excessive workloads and that they do not have sufficient information to give adequate consideration to each case. In many cases they rely almost
entirely on the prior judgment of the local board. 186 Thus, state
appeal board review may be even less "curative" than presidential
board review.187 Impartially constituted state appeal boards, in short,
are probably not a satisfactory substitute for impartially constituted
local boards.
Although there are signs that gross racial imbalance on Selective
Service boards throughout the country is beginning to wane, 188 the
infirmity is still far from being adequately cured. 189 Unfortunately,
composition statistics for individual local boards, which might reveal
the degree of racial exclusion prevalent in particular areas,100 are not
available.191 Even without such statistics, however, it is safe to say,
for the reasons suggested above, that the states and counties most in
need of corrective action to provide Negro representation on draft
boards will be the least likely to obtain it under present circumstances. Therefore, at least in those states historically hostile to full
recognition of civil rights, the President's appointive power alone
may prove ineffective as a means of ridding the SSS of systematic
exclusion.
It is generally recognized that the Supreme Court has been the
moving force behind many of the advances made in governmental
recognition of civil rights.192 In many instances, it appears that a
185. See, e.g., Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle
Course, 54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 2123 (1966); Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under the
Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1014 (1966).
186. Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle Course,
54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 2123, 2159 (1966).
187. See the discussion of curative appeal in pt. IVA. supra.
188. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text.
189. See table accompanying note 52 supra.
190. Locating such areas, of course, involves a difficult and not completely objective
evaluation. But it seems fair to say that certain areas in particular states, for a variety
of historical and cultural reasons, tend to manifest greater overt prejudice and discrimination than do others.
191. According to the Assistant Director of the National Selective Service System,
monthly statistics are compiled which show the number of Negro local draft board
members in each state. But there are no publicly available statistics that show the
number of Negro members on each separate board within the states. Telephone
Interview with Col. Dee Ingold, Assistant Director of the Natl. Selective Serv. Sys.,
at Washington, D.C., Feb. 14, 1968.
192. Over the past decade and a half the Supreme Court has done a great deal to
promote the doctrine of equality which lies at the heart of our constitutional scheme.
See Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 237, 237-39, 24647 (1968); Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, id. at 249. It attacked
racial discrimination in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny;
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judicial decision has been necessary to stimulate action by Congress
and the executive branch and to provide them with the legal mandate to achieve social reform. 193 In the present case, a Supreme
Court decision condemning systematic exclusion in the SSS would
provide the President with significant legal leverage to complement
his persuasive techniques; thus, presidential appeals to the governors
to recommend more Negroes for appointment in all appropriate194
local board jurisdictions might be much more effective.195 Conversely, by completely ignoring the issue of systematic exclusion the
Court could be taken as condoning its continued existence in the
Selective Service System.
Since the latter alternative is obviously undesirable, some form
of judicial relief is appropriate in the Clay case. But how should that
relief be framed in order to secure maximum protection of individual rights while imposing the least possible disruption upon the
operations of the Selective Service System?
B.

Three Avenues of Judicial Relief

Assuming that the Supreme Court explicitly recognizes the
right of Negro registrants to be classified by draft boards form which
members of their race have not been systematically excluded, there
are at least three remedial approaches which the Court might adopt
in framing its response to Clay's contentions of systematic exclusion.
it has exalted the principle of "one man-one vote" in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962);
and, it has emphasized the requirements of equality in the administration of criminal
justice in such cases as Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
193. See Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966). Professor
Cox concludes:
If one arm of government cannot or will not solve an insistent problem, the
pressure falls upon another. It would have been best, no doubt, for the Congress
to have taken the initiative in compelling school desegregation, but legislative
action was blocked by the power of the southern congressmen and the filibuster.
The E.xecutive theoretically could have provided more leadership. As a practical
matter, however, the task of initiating steps to realize a national ideal fell to the
Court; either it had to act or nothing would have been done. Similarly, the state
legislatures initially and, when they failed, the Congress should have dealt with
the spreading cancer of malapportionment, but . . . it was plain that the evil
would continue to grow unless the Court excised it. The same is true of judicial
activism in criminal procedure. In the long run the actual response of Congress to
the Court's invitation is likely to have more influence upon the course of decisions than the bare clarification of its authority, because the need for judicial
action is strongest in the areas of the law where political processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legislative power but because the problem is neglected
by politicians.
194. It would not be necessary to make such recommendations for all boards
"deficient" in Negroes, of course. The determination of "appropriate" boards depends
on many factors, not just race, and simple racial proportion is not the answer to systematic exclusion.
195. Of course, such a decision would also provide another rallying point for the
vocal critics of an "activist" Supreme Court. See Beaney, The Warren Court and the
Political Process, 67 MICH. L. R.Ev. 343, 348-52 (1968).
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I. Denial of Standing Coupled with a Warning
By applying the standing doctrine strictly, the Supreme Court
could focus on the curative aspects of Clay's presidential appeal. 196 The
Court could deny relief on the ground that ultimately Clay had not
been prejudiced as a result of systematic exclusion of Negroes from
his local and state draft boards. This approach would eliminate the
necessity for adjudicating the merits of Clay's contention of system·
atic exclusion, and would avoid the attendant disruption of the SSS
that such direct judicial action might cause.197 But such an opinion
could nonetheless provide a vehicle to transmit a warning to the SSS
to rid itself of systematic exclusion. The warning might be nothing
more than a suggestion that the Court would be receptive to the
systematic exclusion argument at a later date. A bare recognition, in
dictum, of the unconstitutionality and statutory invalidity of systematic exclusion in the Selective Service System would carry such an
implication. A more direct warning might also be included; it could
take the form of an express or implied invitation198 to other Negro
registrants whose aggrievement was not "cured" by presidential
board review to challenge the composition of their Selective Service
boards. 199
The primary reason for the Court to adopt this approach is that
it would provide Congress and the executive branch with sufficient
time to implement appropriate measures to eliminate systematic
196. See pt. IVSA.
197. See text accompanying notes 217-19 infra.
198. On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has issued such an invitation.
In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Court dismissed the appeals of the complainants who asserted that Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptive
devices deprived them of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. The grounds for dismissal were based on the
reasoning that the case presented no justiciable controversy, since the statutes had
seldom been enforced against doctors or patients. "Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated:
Justiciability is of course not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible
of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures, including the appropriateness of the issues for decision by this Court and the
actual hardship to the litigants of denying them the relief sought. Both these
factors justify withholding adjudication of the constitutional issue raised under
the circumstances and in the manner in which they are now before the Court.
367 U.S. at 508-09 (emphasis added). In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
It will be time enough to decide the constitutional questions urged upon us when,
if ever, that real controversy flares up again. Until it does, or until the state makes
a definite and concrete threat to enforce these laws . . . this Court may not be
compelled to exercise its most delicate power of constitutional adjudication.
367 U.S. at 509 (emphasis added). Following this decision, physicians openly challenged
the statutes, invited prosecution, and were convicted. They appealed their convictions
on the fourteenth amendment grounds asserted in Poe v. Ullman and the Supreme
Court permitted standing and granted the requested relief in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
199. An express or impfied invitation might be more likely to appear in a concurring opinion, since this would not require the majority of the Court to obligate
itself to hearing the next case raising the systematic exclusion argument.
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exclusion from the SSS without sacrificing the Court's option to take
affirmative action if the other branches remained inactive. It is also
possible that the mere threat of further judicial action would add
impetus to any attempted reforms from within or without the SSS.
Although this approach appears to mesh with traditional canons
of judicial restraint200 and would probably avoid any immediate
disruption of the SSS, it has three significant shortcomings. First,
as discussed previously, denial of standing might be improper in this
case because of the uncertainty about the actual curative effect of
presidential board review. 201 Second, postponing a formal decision
on the issue of systematic exclusion would, in all probability, postpone any substantive reform as well. A mere judicial warning, even
if expressly stated, would not motivate all of the recalcitrant governors to alter their positions. Progressive governors would implement
programs designed to increase Negro representation on draft boards
in areas of Negro population, but those opposed to change would certainly await a formal judicial condemnation of systematic exclusion before taking steps to eliminate it. Any delay on the part of
the Supreme Court might result in a flurry of local board resignations in anticipation of a Supreme Court decision adverse to systematic exclusion but with only prospective effect. In effect, the way
would be cleared for the submission of an equal number of "midnight recommendations" to the President for the purpose of seating
Caucasian replacements for board members who were nearing the
end of their terms. 202
Perhaps the most serious difficulty is that an implied warning
would leave the Court's actual intentions with regard to systematic
exclusion clouded in ambiguity. Such a warning would be an unfair
inducement to other Negro registrants to risk criminal prosecution
in order to challenge the composition of their draft boards, unless
the Court was willing to vindicate the rights of such registrants by
reversing their convictions. Of course, an express invitation to Negro
registrants would avoid this problem, since it would obligate the
Court to accept the first available systematic exclusion case. But
this would postpone the necessity of adjudicating the issue of systematic exclusion at most until the succeeding Supreme Court term,
since there are many systematic exclusion cases either pending or
200. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-09 (1961). But cf. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
201. See text accompanying notes 121-25 supra.
202. Seating new members who would be entitled to remain at their posts for
twenty-five years or until reaching the age of seventy-five [50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3)
(Supp. III, 1965-1967)] could fix the composition of the boards for a lengthy period

and reduce the prospect of vacancies which might be filled by Negro appointees. Such
a scheme could be easily thwarted by a variety of techniques involving actual reconsti·
tution of the boards pursuant to a constitutional mandate-such as adding additional
members to boards or completely rebuilding tl1em. See te.xt accompanying notes 233-39.
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recently decided by various circuits of the Court of Appeals. 203
Because of the questionable willingness of Congress and the uncertain ability of the President effectively to eliminate systematic exclusion in such a short time absent a judicial mandate, such an express
"invitation" would require the Court to confront the issue a second
time before opportunity for a nonjudicial solution-the reason for
the delay-had arisen. A satisfactory solution to systematic exclusion
in the SSS will not be one which counts delay or indirection among
its strengths. A more straightforward, resolute approach is needed.

2. Extending De Facto Authority to the Selective Service System
A second course of action would be for the Supreme Court to
recognize formally the unconstitutionality and statutory invalidity
of systematic exclusion in the SSS-thereby establishing a judicial
mandate for its elimination-while extending de facto authority 204
to Selective Service boards so that they might continue to function
in the interim before their reconstitution in accordance with the
law. Conceptually, this approach embodies two phases: (1) a general
decision that the constitutional and statutory rights of Negro registrants are infringed by systematic exclusion, and (2) a qualification
to the effect that those rights cannot be vindicated immediately
because of countervailing policy considerations. Thus, Clay's individual rights would be outweighed in the balancing of interests,
but the Court would remove all doubts about the illegality of systematic exclusion in the Selective Service System.205
203. See note 11 supra.
204. The doctrine of de facto authority was originally developed to protect public
interests when those interests were in the hands of persons acting in official capacities,
but not lawfully in office. See, e.g., State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 AM. REP. 409 (1871).
See generally A. CONSTANTINEAU, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE (1910);
3 E. McQu1LL1N, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.106 (3d ed. 1963); Recent Decision,

Challenge to the Selective Service System-The Right to Minority Representation on
Draft Boards, 57 GEo. L.J. 189, 196 (1968). The doctrine has been extended to other
areas as well. Notably, it has been held that laws will not be invalidated as being
unconstitutional on the ground that they were enacted by malapportioned legislatures.
See, e.g., Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964).
Moreover, authority has been extended to malapportioned legislatures to continue to
enact statutes until reapportioned in accordance with the standards set down in Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See, e.g., Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964),
afj'd, 379 U.S. 694 (1965).
205. In the Clay case, however, the Fifth Circuit applied the de facto doctrine as
an alternative ground for denying Clay relief, but failed to specify whether or not
systematic exclusion in the Selective Service System rises to the level of a constitutional
infirmity. Presumably the court was anticipating a possible Supreme Court decision
to that effect, while refusing to accept the systematic exclusion argument itself. See
397 F.2d at 911. Whatever its purpose, the analogy drawn between the acts of malap•
portioned legislatures or county commissions and Selective Services boards, which
supported the Court's willingness to apply the de facto doctrine to racially imbalanced
draft boards, is subject to attack. There are striking dissimilarities between draft boards
and malapportioned legislatures. It is difficult to term draft boards "political authorities" as did the Fifth Circuit. 397 F.2d at 911. Most important, a state legislature
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By applying the doctrine of de facto authority to avoid reversal,
the Court would recognize the fact that a reversal of Clay's conviction might impose a considerable strain on the SSS and the current
war effort, 200 for in substance, such action would mean that draft
boards from which Negroes have been systematically excluded could
not, after that reversal, validly classify Negro registrants. Although
the de facto authority approach is appealing in that it would avoid
a potentially dangerous interruption of the orderly process of military induction,207 its application would raise several difficult questions.
The de facto doctrine is by definition a stop-gap measure. De
facto authority is granted to vital governmental institutions so that
they may continue to function pending the elimination of recognized
constitutional or statutory infirmities.208 The doctrine is designed
only to avoid chaos and confusion, and to prevent debilitating
judicial interruptions.209 Since the extension of de facto authority
to a legally defective institution is justified only by its temporary
nature, the Court, in invoking the doctrine, must determine that it
has the power to assure that the defects in question will in fact be
only temporary. Ultimately, that power will have to rest on the
threat of reversing convictions; the problem is to avoid the disrupgenerally acts with respect to the public at large, whereas a draft board always acts
on individual cases. Thus, while the adverse effects of a "discriminatory" legislature
are spread over large numbers of people and affect them only in a general sense, the
product of a discriminatory draft board is of direct consequence to the individuals
negatively affected. Hence, in terms of individual rights, it is more compelling that
the discrimination of draft boards be eliminated. If a state legislature acts in a discriminatory manner, the group adversely affected is likely to be large, and there is a
greater probability that the illegal action will be challenged in the courts than in the
case of the youthful draft registrant, who may or may not be aware that he has been
treated unfairly by his draft board. Malapportioned legislatures, even with de facto
authority, are subject to a good deal of public scrutiny; the same is not true of draft
boards.
206. Aside from the argument that the de facto authority doctrine should not apply
in cases where important individual rights are at stake (see note 205 supra), such a
balancing process might conceivably involve the Supreme Court in an assessment of
the Vietnam conflict as a "war," and, eventually, of its legality. At least to date, the
Court has demonstrated that it is uninterested in such a determination. See, e.g.,
Hawthorne v. Hardaway, 393 U.S. 802 (1968), in which the Court denied without opinion
a petition for stay which attacked the legality of the war. Justice Douglas dissented in
an eight page opinion.
207. Cf. Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Hughes v.
WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965). In Mann, the district court directed itself to the
problems which would attend any decision declaring malapportioned legislatures unable
to act until effectively reapportioned. "If the present legislature could not act in this
interim, a potentially dangerous interregnum could result, for there would be no legislature available in an emergency." 238 F. Supp. at 459.
208. See generally Pannam, Unconstitutional Statutes and De Facto Officers, 2 FED.
l... R.Ev. 37 (1966).
209. Cf. Griffin's Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 18 (No. 5,815) (C.C.D. Va. 1869): "Without the
rights of de facto governments, who would recognize the Norman titles against the
'Saxon barons?"
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tion that premature reversals would cause while maintaining the
believability-and thus the effectiveness- of the threat. In the context of the Clay case, there are at least two responses which the
Supreme Court might make. First, it could merely apply the de
facto doctrine without mention of any limit on the duration for
which de facto authority is to remain in effect. Such an indefinite
holding, however, would offer no guidelines to the President or
Congress for an appropriate rate of progress in eliminating systematic exclusion. Indeed, it could even have the effect of delaying
progress; recalcitrant governors might look upon the blanket grant
of de facto authority as an indication of the Court's unwillingness
to challenge the structure or composition of the SSS in any direct
way. Thus, governors might feel that they could continue their
discriminatory appointment policies without fear of a direct confrontation with the federal judiciary. This approach would also tend
to bind the Court to a hands-off policy with regard to the SSS before
it could be ascertained whether Congress or the Executive is able to
eliminate systematic exclusion without more active judicial support.
A more direct approach to the problem would be to set a time
limit within which Selective Service boards would have de facto
authority, but beyond which convictions for refusal to submit to
induction would be subject to attack on the ground of systematic
exclusion.210 The time limit could be for the duration of the Vietnam
war or for a time reasonably calculated to allow the boards to be
impartially reconstituted, if necessary by adding extra Negro members to existing boards.211 A slightly different technique would be
to "require" governors to include Negroes in their recommendations
made subsequent to the date of the Court's decision in the Clay case
by refusing de facto recognition to those boards with members nominated in defiance of this requirement. Although this approach
would allow racially exclusive boards to continue to function for a
time, it would avoid any interruption of the operations of the Selective Service System and would ultimately lead to the total elimination of systematic exclusion.

3. Reversal
The problem common to denying standing to Clay and extending
de facto authority to Selective Service boards is that in either event
the Court merely lends its moral support to the task of eliminating
systematic exclusion from local and state draft boards. In substance,
the Court would be deferring to Congress and the President to
210. In malapportionment cases, state legislatures have been directed to reapportion
themselves before a specified date. In Mann v. Davis, 238 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Va. 1964),
afj'd sub nom. Hughes v. WMCA, Inc., 379 U.S. 694 (1965), for example, the Virginia
Assembly was ordered in 1964 to reapportion itself by 1966.
211. There are other possibilities as well. See text accompanying notes 181-95 supra.
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formulate a workable solution to the problem. And for reasons discussed previously,212 neither Congress nor the President may be
willing or able to provide an effective solution without the strongest
kind of judicial intervention. Therefore, a more forthright approach
by the Supreme Court is needed.
The most direct method of eliminating systematic exclusion
would be for the Court to order local and state Selective Service
boards to be reconstituted to include Negro members. 213 But the
Court would not have equity jurisdiction to issue such a mandate
in the review of a criminal conviction, and a separate mandamus
action is impractical for two reasons: the registrant not classified I-A
has little inclination (and perhaps no standing) to bring such a suit,
while the person already classified I-A will not be aided by a subsequent reform in the system. 214
The alternative, therefore, is for the Court to employ a tactic
similar to the one it used in Miranda v. Arizona.215 Clay's criminal
conviction for refusal to submit to induction would be reversed, and
the opinion would contain language to the effect that the Court
would not uphold similar convictions of registrants classified by
draft boards from which members of their respective races had been
systematically excluded. The Court might also include an invitation
to Congress or the executive branch to establish appropiate standards
to insure that draft boards would be staffed in a manner that does
not involve exclusion of Negroes. 216 Such a decision would in212. See tc.xt accompanying notes 171-95 supra.
213. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), in which the Court
ordered public schools to integrate "with all deliberate speed."
214. It is possible that the President would have the requisite standing to bring a
mandamus action, but for many obvious reasons he might be unwilling to do so.
Civil rights organizations such as CORE or the NAACP might have the requisite standing [see Sedler, Standing To Assert ]us Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599,
653 (1962)], but this result is by no means certain.
215. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). There the Court held that a state in a criminal prosecution may not use statements stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after the defendant has been taken into custody, unless procedural
safeguards were invoked in behalf of the defendant to protect his fifth and sixth
amendment rights. The Court set forth a list of procedures to be followed by police
in order to safeguard the individual defendant's rights; it also indicated that in the
absence of other effective measures established by Congress or the states, the courts
would enforce these procedures by reversing convictions. By employing the threat of
reversal in this manner, the Court presented Congress and state legislatures with the
option of accepting by inaction the rigid standards promulgated in Miranda, or undertaking through legislation to provide other effective procedural safeguards.
216. This would be comparable to the Miranda invitation to Congress and state
legislatures to formulate procedures that would effectively protect the fifth and sixth
amendment rights of defendants during interrogation. The Court stated:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent
compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision
in no way creates a constitutional straightjacket which will handicap sound efforts
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directly compel a reconstitution of local and state draft boards which
is indifferent to race; draft boards from which Negroes had been
systematically excluded could not thereafter validly classify Negro
registrants. It is unlikely that governors would refuse to recommend
Negroes for appointment after such a decision. To the contrary,
governors subject to the greatest discriminatory pressures from their
constituents would probably be the :first to make such recommendations. Othenvise, to :fill draft quotas, more Caucasian registrants
would have to be inducted to compensate for the temporary loss of
Negro inductees. 217 On the other hand, the inability to reclassify
(and thus to induct) Negroes might prevent the reclassification and
induction of all registrants within the given board's jurisdiction. To
exempt Negroes from induction, no matter what the reason, while
continuing to induct members of other races, might well violate the
right of the latter groups to equal protection under the law.218
Although reversal initially seems to be a drastic remedy in terms
of its immediate impact on the Selective Service System, the impact
would be great in only a few states outside the South219 and therefore would not place an unbearable strain on the nationwide functioning of the SSS. Moreover, reversal may be the only way to protect the rights of Negro registrants adequately while avoiding the
delays which would invariably attend the other remedies discussed
above. Of course, reversal of an individual registrant's conviction
would not necessarily mean that he would escape induction. The
at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. ·we encourage Congress and the
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting
the rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective
in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the [established) safeguards must be observed.
384 U.S. at 467.
217. The Miranda approach and that suggested here for cases involving systematic
exclusion in the SSS may not be entirely apposite. Governors may not have the same
incentive to avoid reversal of convictions of Negro registrants for refusing to submit to
induction as police would have to avoid reversal of criminal convictions. The threat
of reversal, therefore, might not have as great an impact on a governor's conduct as
it should have on the conduct of police. [Recent evidence indicates that reversal may
not be an effective deterrent to some police activity. See Medalie, Zeitz, &: Alexander,
Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt To Implement
Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1394 (1968).] But public and political pressure would
be brought to bear on any governor who refused to recommend Negroes, since refusal
would interrupt the supply of manpower for the Armed Forces and would be viewed
as contrary to the national interest. Moreover, if governors refused to make Negro
recommendations following a Supreme Court reversal, the President, who is ultimately
responsible for providing adequate manpower to the Armed Forces through the SSS,
could arguably circumvent the governors and make his draft board appointments
directly. See notes 203, 204 infra.
218. This violation would have to be based on the general concept of equal protec•
tion outside of the fourteenth amendment, since the action of SSS is federal. See note
55 supra.
:;i19, See Table accompanying note 52 supra.
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individual Selective Service files could be returned to the appropriate local board for reconsideration after the boards in that jurisdiction had been impartially reconstructed. Such reconsideration
assures that the registrant will be classified by Selective Service boards
which at least offer the opportunity for fair representation of all the
important segments in the population of the community.220

VI.

CHANGE "WITHIN THE EXISTING STRUCTURE:
SECURING THE REQUIRED REFORM

Any form of judicial condemnation of systematic exclusion of
Negroes from Selective Service boards will require significant changes
in the SSS. As suggested above, achieving changes may be difficult in
this context. Moreover, if change is mandated, it must be accomplished swiftly. Therefore, it seems appropriate to consider briefly
the practical opportunities for reform which do exist.
Most recent draft reform proposals advocate complete restructuring of the SSS.221 But aside from the fact that the present statutory
and administrative structure has existed for over two decades, 222
our current military commitments in Vietnam seem certain to preclude any such sweeping changes.223 These considerations must also
bear upon judicial consideration of a case such as Clay; for example,
reversal of the conviction might be viewed as intolerable unless
there are feasible means to bring Negroes into the Selective Service
boards within a relatively short period of time. But since statutory
reform by Congress is unlikely until the Vietnam conflict ends,
systematic exclusion will be eliminated only if the courts can initiate
prompt action within the existing structure.
As a first step, it is submitted that the governors 224 should impartially select a pool of nominees for each local and state appeal
220. Clay's draft boards already may have been reconstituted so that they are no
longer characterized by systematic exclusion. See Table accompanying note 52 supra.
In that case, Clay could be reclassified immediately by his local board.
221. E.g., MARSHALL COMMISSION REPORT 31-36; J. DOLBEARE & K. DAVIS, LITTLE
GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 195-219. President Nixon, among
others, has suggested the possibility of replacing the draft with a volunteer army. N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at I, col. 8.
222. The present structure was created in 1948, and has continued virtually unchanged up until the present time.
223. President Nixon's proposal for eliminating the draft calls for a plan to replace
it with an all-volunteer military after the current war effort has substantially subsided.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at I, col. 8. When wartime manpower demands diminish,
however, conscription affects fewer people, and unfortunately, public pressure to reform
draft processes and find alternatives to compulsory military service invariably decreases.
224. Up to now, the primary impediment to racial integration on Selective Service
boards in certain states has been the unwillingness of governors to recommend Negroes
to the President for appointment. See pt. V.A. infra. Thus, any plan to eliminate systematic exclusion from the SSS must focus on the gubernatorial role in the appointive
process.
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board.225 It should be re-emphasized that the goal here is impartiality;
Negroes do not have to be deliberately included in the pool in proportion to their representation in a particular community. Rather,
the governors should make an essentially random selection from a
qualified base that includes all the diverse segments in the community.226
It might be argued that creation of such nominee pools would
undermine the congressional purpose in requiring gubernatorial
nomination of all Selective Service board personnel.227 The governors are part of the process presumably because they have a greater
awareness of local conditions and closer contacts with local officials
and civic leaders who can suggest nominees than would federal
officials at national headquarters.228 But given this intention, there
is no statutory requirement that the governors' screening of potential appointees be limited to the exact number of vacancies available
at any one time. Instead, it seems that the governors are supposed to
engage in a qualitative screening process in which there are few disqualifying criteria for nominees, 229 but, as suggested in this Comment, one important constitutional constraint on the governors.
Thus, requiring governors to select pools of nominees rather than to
submit recommendations only to fill existing vacancies is proper in
terms of the congressional concept of the governors' role in the SSS.
Moreover, such a requirement does not conflict with the specific
statutory provisions dealing with gubernatorial appointment procedures.230
Creation of these impartially chosen pools would provide a
225. The pools would not have to be very large. Five or ten persons for each Selec·
tive Service board would be sufficient.
226. The governors would perform much the same function as jury commissioners
selecting venires. They would be obligated to ascertain whether or not there are
qualified Negroes for draft board membership in each local board jurisdiction. In
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950), the Court stated: "When the commissioners
were appointed as judicial administrative officials, it was their duty to familiarize
themselves fairly with the qualifications of the eligible jurors of the county without
regard to race or color." Like jury commissioners, governors would be required to
follow a course of conduct in the selection of nominees which would not "operate
to discriminate ... on racial grounds." Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
227. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
228. Another possible explanation for the provision requiring gubernatorial nominations is that it avoids the cost of hiring administrative personnel to perform the function. On the extreme cost consciousness of the SSS, see J. DAVIS &: K. DOLBEARE, Lrrn.E
GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSI'EM 38-39 (1968).
229. See the discussion of standards for local board membership in note 38 supra.
230. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967) does not stipulate how the
recommendations are to be made, except in requiring that they not be made in a
discriminatory manner. 50 U.S.C. App. § 455(a) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). Moreover there
is no limitation on the number of recommendations that is appropriate. See 50 U.S.C.
App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
The creation of these pools should pose no serious administrative problems either.
Civic or other community groups could be requested to submit names for consideration.
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reasonably representative cross section of the various communities.231 The President could then make his appointments consonant
with the theoretical philosophy underlying the SSS-that local
draft boards should be composed of neighbors of the registrants and
thus, implicitly, that the boards should be as representative as possible of the communities they serve.232
Although appointments made after the creation of these pools
would be impartial, existing imbalances resulting from systematic
exclusion should also be eliminated. The appointment of new draft
board members only as vacancies occur would allow many improperly constituted boards to continue in operation for a significant
period of time. 233 The President could deal with such boards in
two ways. First, he could appoint additional members to sit on local
and state appeal boards in jurisdictions in which there is racial imbalance that is the product of systematic exclusion.234 This technique
would be particularly appropriate where a majority or substantial
minority of the population is Negro but no Negroes serve on the
Selective Service boards.23 ;; The second, and more direct approach,
would be for the President to disband all imbalanced draft boards in
jurisdictions in which there is systematic exclusion and then to appoint new boards from the impartially chosen pools.236 This is not
prohibited by the Selective Service Act, which grants the President
broad powers to create and maintain draft boards.237 Furthermore,
this approach would not violate any rights of present board members
231. Although the statute does not require it, it would seem reasonable to require
the pools to reflect a cross section of the community. This would not mean that every
draft board would have to be constituted to represent a cross section of the community,
but it would at least ensure that all segments of the local population have the op•
portunity to be appointed. The federal rule pertaining to juries, which is not applicable to the states, is that panels must reflect a cross section of the community. Cf. Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
232. See pt. I supra. There is every indication that the executive branch is desirous
of bringing Negroes into full participation in the SSS. This is indicated by the nationwide increase in Negro representation on draft boards since 1966. Only in several
Southern states has there been little or no progress. Compare note 45 with note 52
supra. As a practical matter, therefore, it is apparent that the President has already
adopted a policy of fair and impartial appointment.
233. Because draft board members are granted twenty-five year maximum tenures
of office, sy,tematic e.xclusion might have a protracted e.xistence.
234. The statute provides for the appointment of three or more members by the
Presidrnt. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967). There is no maximum number prescribed.
235. This would also be useful to cure racially exclusive appeal boards. Negro
ml-mbers could be added with very little difficulty. In either instance, of course, such
action is not strictly "impartial." However, since the newly appointed pools would
be the p1incipal element of change, the impartiality is perhaps justifiable as a one-shot
remedy applicable to only the most discriminatory areas.
·
236. Of course, it would be necessary to disband e.xisting boards only in states which
did not already have impartially constituted boards.
237. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b){3) (Supp. III, 1965-1967).
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since they serve at the grace of the President238 and do not receive
remuneration for their services.239 Moreover, governors could place
the incumbent board members in the newly created pools along with
additional nominees, and many incumbents undoubtedly would
be re.turned to their positions. This second approach has the advantage of providing an immediate solution to the problem of
systematic exclusion without increasing the size of local and state
appeal boards.
The plan suggested in this discussion is subject to one fundamental weakness: it presupposes a willingness to work for reform on
the part of all participants in the appointive process. The most important ingredient in the proposed plan is that governors, particularly from the states in which systematic exclusion is most evident,
must agree to establish impartially chosen pools of nominees so that
the President's appointments can be made in a manner which exemplifies equal treatment of all persons regardless of race. Yet it is
this ingredient of gubernatorial cooperation that is all too likely to
be missing. Although the executive branch has demonstrated its willingness to appoint Negroes to draft boards whenever it has been
enabled to do so by impartial gubernatorial recommendations,:w,
statistics indicate that the governors of some states have neglected to
include Negroes in their recommendations. 241 As pointed out above,
this could be a serious barrier to the President if he had to rely exclusively on his persuasive powers. However, condemnation of systematic exclusion in the SSS by the Supreme Court might strengthen his
position considerably. If some governors still prove recalcitrant, their
cooperation should be found unnecessary. Apart from arguments
based upon the proposition that governors who refuse to nominate
Negroes deny Negro registrants their fifth amendment rights, 242 a
strong argument for bypassing such governors can be made from the
prohibition of discrimination contained in the Universal Military
Training and Service Act. 243 Because the right of the governors to
participate in the selection of board members arises from the Act, it
is the intent of Congress, which passed the Act, that controls in the
determination of what effect is to be given to the governors' nominations if those nominations constitute violations of the Constitution
or the Act. While this problem does not appear to have received
specific congressional attention, the need to induct registrants and
238. See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897), in which it was held that
the President has power to remove an inferior officer prior to the expiration of that
officer's statutory term of office. It is important to note that the officer in Parsonsa United States district attorney-was salaried.
239. 32 C.F.R. § 1603.3 (1968).
240. See table accompanying note 52 supra.
241 See id.
242. See pt. III supra.
243. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
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the constitutional barriers to doing so in states where systematic
exclusion is practiced lead to the conclusion that Congress "intended" to allow presidential appointments without a governor's recommendation where necessary.244 Such a conclusion is reasonable,
since it merely recognizes that when the only recommendations
actually available to the President have been made in violation of
the law, he cannot be forced to violate the law himself by choosing
appointees from among them.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not the issue of systematic exclusion in the SSS
is decided by the Supreme Court will depend upon how the Court
views the balance benveen individual rights and military necessity.
In general, this case is also one in which the Court must assess the
wisdom of either judicial activism or judicial passivism. This Comment has attempted to present the arguments on these questions,
and to suggest several possible courses of action. Ultimately, the fact
that the nation is engaged in armed conflict in Vietnam and that the
Selective Service System is a vital link in the chain which ensures the
nation's preparedness to meet its military commitments may encourage the Court to exercise judicial restraint and avoid adjudication of the specific constitutional issues. Yet, the Court has an obligation to the Constitution. As long as means may be found both to
meet the nation's military needs and to assure those individual
rights which the nation is committed to defend, the Supreme Court
must search out those means.
244. If, in a hypothetical case, a governor refused to recommend any persons to
serve on draft boards, and the number of members on a draft board in the state fell
below the minimum required by statute (three), it seems obvious that the President
would have the power to make the necessary appointment to fill the vacancy without
gubernatorial nomination.

